Weekly Update #127
August 5, 2024

Covers those granted refugee status, temporary asylum status, temporary protection, or statuses through similar national protection schemes, as well as those recorded in the country under other forms of stay

Refugees from Ukraine recorded beyond Europe

558,300

Last updated April 1 2024

Refugees from Ukraine recorded globally

6,579,700

Last updated July 15 2024

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Source: UNHCR collation of statistics made available by the authorities

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Source: UNHCR - Ukraine Situation Flash Update #71

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The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) predicts the outflow of another 700,000 Ukrainians abroad by the end of 2025

The reason for the increase in the number of migrants is cited by the NBU as long-term power outages and the integration of Ukrainians abroad

The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has worsened its forecasts for the migration of Ukrainians: if in April of this year it expected an outflow of 200,000 this year and an inflow of 400,000 next year, now it estimates the outflow this year at 400,000, and next year at 300,000.

"This assumption has been worsened compared to the April Inflation Report due to the significant destruction of the Ukrainian energy system, which is accompanied by long-term power outages and increases the risks for the heating season," the regulator's July inflation report, published on Friday, notes.

The National Bank adds that in addition to everyday difficulties, frequent power outages have a negative impact on production processes, which reduces economic activity and demand for labor, further stimulating migration.

In absolute figures, we are talking about an increase in the number of migrants remaining abroad this year to 6.7 million, and next year to 7 million.

The NBU cites UN data, according to which in the first half of this year, the number of migrants abroad increased by 240,000, to 6.6 million people.

In the new report, the National Bank moved the expected start date of Ukrainians returning home from 2025 to 2026. According to its forecasts, 200,000 Ukrainians may return home in the first quarter of 2026 and the same number by the end of the year, although in the April inflation report the net influx in 2026 was estimated at 800,000 people.

The Central Bank explains the change in its forecasts by both the deterioration of living conditions in Ukraine, including due to power outages, and the factor of greater adaptation of Ukrainians abroad due to the long duration of their stay.

Thus, the NBU now estimates the number of compatriots-migrants abroad at the end of 2026 at 6.6 million versus 5.3 million in the April inflation report.

It is indicated that the number of internally displaced persons will also remain significant, because, according to surveys, a significant part of them have nowhere to return due to significant destruction of residential infrastructure.

"Currently, the negative risks of an even greater outflow of migrants abroad, their smaller and later return prevail. Significant factors for this may be legislative decisions of the governments of recipient countries to deepen the integration of Ukrainian migrants in the host countries, and their children in the educational systems of the host countries, and, accordingly, an increase in the tendency to unite families abroad," the regulator notes.

The National Bank believes that this will affect the supply of labor, consumer demand and restrain economic growth.

"Significant changes in the economy structure and the increased need for skilled labor will lead to further strengthening of imbalances in the labor market, which will stimulate wage growth above productivity growth in certain sectors," the regulator predicts.

On the other hand, the rapid restoration of housing, infrastructure and an increase in the number of jobs due to the economic revival may lead to a more active return of migrants, the central bank notes.

Source: Interfax Ukraine

THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Humanitarian Access in Ukraine - Overview

The escalation of hostilities in Donetska Oblast and the Russian cross-border incursion into Kharkivska Oblast, as well as the high intensity of attacks along the Dnipro River in Khersonska Oblast, remained the primary impediment to humanitarians' access to assist people in need. Humanitarian action in the Ukrainian territories occupied by the Russian Federation remained severely constrained.

Humanitarian workers faced dangerous conditions, especially close to the front line. Nineteen incidents associated with the security environment were reported by humanitarians working in areas affected by hostilities. Two humanitarians were killed, one of them in the line of duty. Also, 12 humanitarians were injured, including a humanitarian deminer in Mykolaivska Oblast, in 8 incidents. The majority of such incidents occurred within 5 km of the front line. Strikes in major cities with a significant presence of humanitarian actors — Dnipro and Kharkiv — resulted in four humanitarian casualties.

Damage to humanitarian assets and facilities due to strikes continued to limit humanitarian operations. Ten incidents affected humanitarian operations in Dnipropetrovska, Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, Mykolaivska, Sumska and Zaporizka oblasts with reported damage to five assets, three offices and facilities and two warehouses. These incidents were almost evenly distributed between front-line and rear locations, demonstrating the challenging operational environment for relief efforts across the most affected regions of Ukraine.

The Humanitarian Access Working Group, through the Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework (AMRF), reported 72 cases impacting humanitarian activities in May-June 2024, more than doubling the 27 incidents recorded over the previous two months and the 34 instances of access restriction documented in May-June 2023. The highest increase of reports was in relation to the military mobilization of humanitarian staff or contractors, with 46 cases in total. The consequences of these incidents ranged from the loss of staff, including key personnel, to delays in implementing projects due to self-limiting road movements to contractors' failures to meet project commitments, among others.

The adoption and enforcement of new legislation on mobilization are having direct and indirect impacts on the ability of humanitarian organizations to assist affected people in a timely and effective manner. If this trend continues, it could reduce the operational capacity of humanitarian partners.

Military administration permits continue to be enforced for Khersonska Oblast, with additional authorizations now required for two hromadas in the north of Kharkivska Oblast. In Khersonska Oblast, the use of the Humanitarian Notification System (HNS) has contributed to facilitating humanitarian organizations’ access to people in need. In Kharkivska Oblast, restrictions are reported to be more pronounced due to the intensity of hostilities during the period of the report.

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Emergency Humanitarian Response: January to June 2024

In June, civilians were impacted by hostilities and attacks across Ukraine and faced extended power cuts in some cities due to damage to civilian infrastructure. The east of the country and parts of Khersonska Oblast were particularly impacted, with Pokrovsk Town in Donetska Oblast suffering repeated attacks in late June, causing over 40 civilian casualties. Strikes also impacted residential areas in urban centres like Kryvyi Rih, further from the front line, where 40 civilians were killed or injured. Over 100 attacks on energy facilities, ongoing since March, have affected the energy supply across Ukraine. During this period, humanitarian partners continued to work alongside first responders and local authorities to address immediate needs after attacks and provide further support as part of their regular programming across most affected locations.

As of the end of June 2024, humanitarian organizations assisted 5.6 million people with at least one form of aid. In June alone, they supported 300,000 people. More than 500 humanitarian organizations, with over 380 of them being national non-governmental organizations, provided the assistance. Humanitarians reached more than 4.3 million people with water, sanitation and hygiene assistance, mainly through system maintenance and repairs and emergency water supply. Aid workers also delivered food and farming supplies to nearly 2.8 million people, mostly in front-line areas. Almost 1.3 million people received health-care assistance, and over 1 million were supported with fuel, shelter materials and other non-food items. Humanitarians also provided protection support to about 2.8 million people, including protection services, child protection, response to gender-based violence and mine action activities. In particular, aid workers rendered child-specific protection services, including psychosocial support, for 900,000 people. Nearly 640,000 people were assisted to ensure the continuity of learning. Partners also distributed multi-purpose cash assistance to 560,000 people to cover their basic and immediate needs. Humanitarians undertook activities for gender-based violence prevention and support to survivors. They also conducted explosive ordnance risk education. Aid workers continued improving living conditions for internally displaced people in collective sites.

From January to June, partners also delivered humanitarian assistance through 23 inter-agency convoys for nearly 35,000 people in the most-affected front-line areas of Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska and Zaporizka oblasts, complementing partners’ regular programming activities.

The funding shortfall continues to prevent humanitarians from fully addressing critical needs, with the winter season fast approaching. By the end of June, the humanitarian community received only 28 per cent of the US$3.1 billion under the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan. As attacks continue to damage energy facilities and destroy homes, the humanitarian situation in Ukraine is expected to worsen during the coming winter, potentially leaving many without reliable access to heating and electricity. Without timely and predictable funding, the ability of humanitarians to provide critical assistance and prevent hardship for the people worst affected by the war will decrease.

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2024 - 2025 Winter Response Plan

As Ukraine approaches its third winter since the escalation of the war in February 2022, increased attacks on energy infrastructure since the end of 2023 and throughout the first half of 2024 and sustained hostilities impacting front-line cities, towns and villages continue to inflict severe suffering on millions of people.

To address the winter-specific needs, the humanitarian community launched the 2024-2025 Winter Response Plan, appealing for US$492.1 million to support 1.8 million people with critical winter-related humanitarian assistance as outlined in the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan.

This Plan intends to support timely preparedness and response to winter-related humanitarian needs caused or exacerbated by the cold season in Ukraine from October 2024 to March 2025. The most vulnerable people will receive support in five key areas — Camp Coordination and Camp Management, Health, Livelihoods, Shelter and Non-Food Items and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. Humanitarians will prioritize assistance to the most vulnerable people along the front line and in the oblasts bordering the Russian Federation.

This Plan has been developed to support the efforts of the Government of Ukraine and will be complemented by development and recovery actors to contribute to building the country’s resilience to the cold season.

Funding

In 2024, the humanitarian community appealed for US$3.11 billion to assist 8.5 million people out of the 14.6 million in need of aid across Ukraine, as outlined in the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP). This funding is crucial for maintaining a humanitarian presence and sustaining response efforts to meet the needs, particularly in the most affected areas. Some 28 per cent of the required contributions were received in the first six months of 2024, according to the 2024 HNRP Financial Tracking Service with some 5.6 million people assisted by the end of June.

Source: UNOCHA

STATUS OF THE CONFLICT

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against an oil depot in Rostov Oblast and missile strikes against fuel storage warehouses in occupied Luhansk City on August 4. Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage and reported on August 4 that Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in Azov, Rostov Oblast. Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev announced on August 4 that fire fighters were extinguishing a large fire at a warehouse in Azov, but specifically noted that Russian authorities would establish the cause after extinguishing the fire. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on August 4 that Ukrainian forces launched eight ATACMS missiles and four Storm Shadow missiles at Luhansk City. Pasechnik claimed that Russian air defense shot down four missiles, that some missiles struck warehouses containing fuel storage, and that some falling missile debris caused dry grass to catch fire. Footage published on August 4 purportedly shows two smoke plumes over Luhansk City. Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported fires at the Luhansk machine-building plant in Luhansk City, where Russian forces reportedly repair and store military equipment. ISW cannot confirm what type of missiles Ukrainian forces used in the Luhansk City strike at this time.

Ukraine confirmed that it has received the first batch of US-made F-16 fighter jets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on August 4 that Ukraine received an unspecified number of F-16s from unspecified Western countries and specifically thanked Denmark, the Netherlands, and the US. The Economist reported on August 4 that Ukraine has so far received 10 of the promised 79 jets and that Ukrainian forces should be able to fly 20 F-16s by the end of 2024. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine will need a substantial number of F-16 jets in order to field them at the scale necessary for Ukraine to succeed in integrating fixed wing aircraft into its wider air defense umbrella. Ukraine will also notably need to continue efforts to target Russian air defense assets within the Russian rear and in occupied Ukraine with Western-provided long-range weapons to enable its use of F-16 jets.

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck four Russian S-400 air defense missile launchers, an S-500 air defense system, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) Rostov-on-Don Kilo-class submarine in occupied Crimea on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 3 that the strikes significantly damaged four Russian S-400 missile launchers in unspecified areas in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on August 3 that Ukrainian forces successfully destroyed a Russian S-400 and S-500 air defense system that the Russian military had deployed to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge. ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Ukrainian forces striking Russian air defense systems in occupied Crimea on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian strike sank the Rostov-on-Don at the Sevastopol port. Ukrainian forces previously struck and significantly damaged the submarine at the Sevastopol port in September 2023, after which it underwent repairs at the port. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian MGM-140 ATACMS strike against occupied Sevastopol on August 2. Satellite imagery captured on August 2 shows some damage to a structure purportedly protecting the Rostov-on-Don in the Sevastopol port, but ISW cannot yet independently verify reports that the Ukrainian strike destroyed the submarine.

Ukrainian forces also conducted a series of successful drone strikes against likely military targets in Rostov, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts on August 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Morozovsk Airfield and nearby ammunition and glide bomb storage facilities with an unspecified number of drones and that Ukrainian forces are conducting a battle damage assessment. Footage published on August 3 shows secondary explosions near the Morozovsk Airfield consistent with strikes against an ammunition depot, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched roughly 55 drones at targets in Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the SBU and GUR also targeted a number of oil depots and fuel and lubricant storage facilities in Rostov, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources within Ukrainian special services stated that the GUR struck the Atlas oil refinery in Rostov Oblast with 15 drones and that Russian forces were using the Atlas oil refinery to fuel military equipment in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed that Ukrainian drones also struck the Gubkinsky oil depot in Belgorod Oblast, which reportedly supplies motor fuels to the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 75 drones over Russia and the Sea of Azov on the night of August 2 to 3.

The Kremlin reportedly planned to transfer unspecified missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis in Yemen but did not transfer the materiel following diplomatic pressure. Russia's reported plan highlights its growing military partnership with Iran and suggests that Russia likely aims to leverage Iranian proxies to indirectly confront the West and shape Western decision making. CNN reported on August 2 that US officials and other sources familiar with the matter stated that Russia was preparing to deliver unspecified missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis in late July 2024 but backed down from the plan following US and Saudi diplomatic outreach. US officials reportedly stated that they are unsure if Saudi protests were the determining factor for ending the planned transfer, however. CNN's sources stated that at least three Russian military officials traveled to Yemen in late July 2024 to advise the Houthis and possibly assist the Houthis with live fire exercises, which the Houthis later cancelled. US officials reportedly stated that Russia viewed arming and advising the Houthis as a retaliatory measure for lifting some US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons for strikes within Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on June 6 that Russia would provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West as a "symmetrical response" to the lifting of some of these restrictions. Russia's reported plans to support the Houthis in order to indirectly confront the West and threaten further escalation cohere with several Russia information and hybrid operations that aim to encourage the West to self-deter from supporting Ukraine over fears of confrontation with Russia.

Source: ISW (August 4 and August 3 updates)

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Ukraine orders evacuations from Donetsk towns as Russia claims advance

Evacuation comes as President Zelenskyy says F-16s have been delivered to Ukraine.

Ukraine has announced the mandatory evacuation of children and their guardians from areas in the eastern region of Donetsk, where Russia has been claiming advances.

Hours earlier on Sunday, Russia said its forces had seized a nearby village after claiming a string of villages had fallen to its forces in recent weeks – many consisting of a few streets.

“The enemy is bombing the towns and villages of these communities every day, so it was decided to evacuate children with their parents or other legal representatives,” Donetsk Governor Vadym Filashkin said.

Filashkin cited the town of Novogrodovka, about 20km (12 miles) from the village of Novoselivka Persha, which Russia’s Ministry of Defence said it captured on Sunday.

The Russian news agency TASS quoted the ministry as saying Russian units defeated four Ukrainian brigades and “the enemy lost up to 95 servicemen and two ammunition depots.”

The governor said 744 children and their families had to be relocated to four regions of Ukraine.

“I have instructed that only armoured vehicles be involved in the process of evacuating children as the enemy is actively using first person view drones in these communities,” Filashkin said.

“We must make every effort to protect our children,” he added.

Filashkin has been urging civilians to flee the region over recent weeks because of an increase in Russian bombardments.

Now grinding through a third year of fighting, neither Kyiv nor Moscow has managed to swing the conflict decisively in its favour, even though Moscow’s forces have gained ground in recent months.

Source: Al Jazeera

UPDATES ON INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE

Military assistance is stepped up

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, bilateral military assistance has been significantly stepped up, with many allies supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine for the first time. For some countries such as Germany, and historically neutral countries such as Sweden, this has represented a significant reversal of their previous defence policies which ruled out providing offensive weapons.

As the conflict in Ukraine has evolved, so has the types of weaponry being provided. There were fears that the provision of increasingly more sophisticated weaponry could escalate the conflict.

Air defence remains a priority, along with the supply of ammunition and long-range strike capabilities. Delays in assistance are considered by NATO to have impacted Ukraine’s ability to defend its lines and Russian forces have subsequently made tactical gains in eastern Ukraine. Several countries, including the UK, have said that weapons donated to Ukraine could be used, in self-defence, to strike legitimate military targets inside Russia. In response, Russia has accused NATO and the US of “provoking a new level of tension”.

Allies have also increasingly turned their attention towards practical implementation of the long term security guarantees that were promised to Ukraine in July 2023. At the centre of those plans is the continued provision of modern equipment, long term capability development and the strengthening of Ukraine’s defence industrial base as a means of achieving greater self-sufficiency in weapons production.

This briefing paper sets out the headline military commitments to Ukraine by its largely Western allies and partners, and any potential issues in terms of ongoing support. It does not examine the deployment of forces to the eastern flank of NATO, or wider humanitarian and economic support to Ukraine.

US military support to Ukraine

The US is the largest provider of military assistance to Ukraine. At the time of writing, the total level of military assistance provided by the US since the start of the Biden administration stands at $54.4 billion (PDF). $53.7 billion of that funding had been provided since February 2022.

The latest levels of funding reflect several new substantial packages of assistance announced by the US administration after Congress approved a $60.8 billion funding package for Ukraine towards the end of April 2024, after several months of delay.

UK military assistance

The UK is one of the leading donors to Ukraine, alongside the US and Germany. To date, the UK has pledged £12.5 billion in support to Ukraine since February 2022, of which £7.6 billion is for military assistance. This includes £3 billion for military assistance in 2024/25.

The UK is providing both lethal and non-lethal weaponry, including tanks, air defence systems and long-range precision strike missiles. While the UK has committed to training Ukrainian fast jet pilots, combat fighter aircraft will not be provided.

The UK is also hosting a training programme (Operation Interflex), which is supported by several allies. Over 30,000 Ukrainian personnel have been trained so far, with the aim of training a further 10,000 by mid-2024.

NATO and the EU

NATO, as an alliance, has been clear in its political support of Ukraine and fully supports the provision of bilateral military assistance by individual allies. NATO has been helping to coordinate requests for assistance from the Ukrainian government and has been supporting the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid through its pre-existing Comprehensive Assistance Package. In July 2024 NATO agreed to take on a greater role in the coordination of military assistance and training among NATO allies and will work in conjunction with the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Allies also agreed to a “minimum baseline funding of €40 billion [for Ukraine military assistance] within the next year”.

Ukraine is not a NATO member, however, and therefore isn’t party to NATO’s mutual defence clause under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. As such, NATO troops will not be deployed on the ground in Ukraine. Allies have also ruled out imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine because it would bring Russia into direct conflict with NATO forces.

The European Union is also providing non-lethal and lethal arms and training through its European Peace Facility (EPF). This is the first time the bloc has, in its history, approved the supply of lethal weapons to a third country. To date, the EU has committed €11.1 billion of EPF funding for military support to Ukraine, including €5 billion for a dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund which was agreed in March 2024. Reaching agreement on that fund has taken several months amid disagreements on the size of the fund and how it should operate.

Using profits from sanctioned Russian assets

Separate proposals have recently been agreed by the G7 countries and the EU Member States that will see the profits from sanctioned Russian assets, held in their respective jurisdictions, used to help finance military assistance to Ukraine. Under the EU agreement the first tranche of funding for weapons purchases, channelled through the European Peace Facility, is expected in July 2024.

Comparative data

This paper does not attempt to rank countries in terms of the military assistance they are providing to Ukraine or to make comparisons between individual countries and/ or the US and Europe.

Comparative data on the level of assistance being provided to Ukraine is available from organisations such as the Kiehl Institute through its Ukraine Support Tracker.

However, such figures discuss assistance through a broad lens and include economic, financial and humanitarian assistance as well as military aid. They also include future commitments, which in some cases have been made to 2026/27 and do not just reflect assistance provided, or funds spent, to date. On this basis, the Kiehl Institute has reported that European assistance to Ukraine is far greater than that provided by the US. However, as the Institute itself acknowledges in its 16 February 2024 update, there is a significant gap between European funding that has been committed and funding that has actually been allocated or spent and that to fully replace US military assistance in 2024, Europe would need to double its current level of arms assistance.

Making comparisons is also complicated by the fact that many countries do not publish information on a consistent basis, and it is unclear where the distinction between certain sorts of assistance, such as mine clearance or non-lethal aid, may lie.

Source: UK Parliament