Weekly Update #139
October 28, 2024

General Figures

Refugees from Ukraine recorded across Europe 

6,191,800

Last updated October 15 2024

Covers those granted refugee status, temporary asylum status, temporary protection, or statuses through similar national protection schemes, as well as those recorded in the country under other forms of stay 

Refugees from Ukraine recorded beyond Europe

560,200

Last updated October 15 2024

Covers those granted refugee status, temporary asylum status, temporary protection, or statuses through similar national protection schemes, as well as those recorded in the country under other forms of stay 

Refugees from Ukraine recorded globally

6,752,000

Last updated October 15 2024

Estimated number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Ukraine (as of Aug 2024)

3,669,000

Source: UNHCR collation of statistics made available by the authorities

The humanitarian situation in Ukraine worsened in August and September, due to intensified attacks in the northeast, east and south. According to the Human Rights Monitoring Mission to Ukraine  (HRMMU) in September, over 1,400 deaths and injuries were verified, the highest number since the start of the full-scale invasion. Homes, hospitals and schools have been damaged, in addition to the disruption of other essential services, including water and electricity. Humanitarian organizations had to adapt to the rapidly changing environment to meet the growing needs for assistance and protection services.

The escalation of hostilities has significantly increased humanitarian needs near the front line. Civilians remaining front-line communities in Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizka oblasts face dire living conditions, which is expected to worsen as winter approaches. WHO verified 66 attacks on health-care facilities in Ukraine, more than a third of such attacks globally. In Donestka Oblast, the relocation of health facilities to other parts of the country has posed challenges to access health care in the region. Students, required to use online learning, struggle to connect due to and unpredictable electricity cuts and limited safe learning spaces. Under constant shelling and with limited access to critical services, limited shops, pharmacies and banks, people remaining close to the front line need shelter repairs, family items, hygiene products, clean water and food. Kharkiv and Kherson cities have been facing these conditions for some time, while Zaporizhzhia has more recently been under frequent attacks, affecting civilians and civilian infrastructure.

Damage to energy infrastructure is expected to worsen the challenges civilians will face in the coming winter, which is forecasted to be the toughest for Ukrainians since February 2022. The impact of the attacks on power supply may disrupt essential services such as water, gas and heating in Ukraine, particularly front-line communities. Under these circumstances, humanitarians adapted their response to meet the needs of people ahead of below-zero temperatures.

Government-led evacuation mandates have expanded, and with the support of some national NGOs and humanitarian partners, some of the most vulnerable people have relocated to safer areas. In September, the number of people leaving front-line communities in Donetska Oblast increased to over 1,000 people daily. Donetska Oblast authorities evacuated families with children from over 40 towns, which reduced Pokrovsk’s population from 70,000 to 16,000 due to escalating hostilities. In Sumska Oblast, increased strikes and attacks led to mandatory evacuation orders in more than 30 towns and villages. Evacuations also continued in Kharkivska and Khersonska oblasts.

Source: OCHA

Toward a Plan B for Peace in Ukraine

The International Crisis Group has produced this analysis paper, proposing a path for a Plan B for Peace.  This article is featured here in full.  It is a lengthy article that touches on key elements that need to be considered in a complex process involving a range of players that need to arrive at a strategic consensus.  To facilitate understanding this complexity, we are starting the article with its final segment and then proceeding to cover the details.

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Russia’s war in Ukraine has become a war of exhaustion. In Kyiv, talk has turned to some form of ceasefire, though not one on Moscow’s terms. The key is to forge a path toward a truce that can last and lay groundwork for a more, rather than less, secure Europe.

Looking Ahead

For now, prospects for talks appear slim and, even were Russia and Ukraine to return to the table, addressing the sticking points evident in 2022 would still be a challenge. The Kremlin believes it is on the front foot and has no incentive to talk – at least not until the direction of U.S. policy after November’s election has come into view. Nor does Kyiv see anything to gain in trying, given the preconditions Moscow has set. Even were those calculations to change, a path to a sustainable deal that stops the fighting by freezing front lines is not clear. Were Ukraine to forego NATO membership, as it appears to have been prepared to do in 2022, it would need deterrence, at least in the form of a strong military, to prevent further Russian advances. The alternative would leave Ukraine defenceless, relying only on its declared neutrality to protect it. Kyiv and most European capitals would resist such a deal: not only would it be precarious for Ukraine itself, but it would likely be also a recipe for further instability in Europe. Such a deal would put enormous pressure on the U.S., especially if it had acted as a broker, to step in if Russia were to renege on its terms and advance further.

Still, Ukraine and its backers, most notably the U.S., could and should take steps to prepare the ground for talks. It is possible to do so without undercutting Ukraine’s negotiating position and indeed may be crucial to strengthening that stance. First, though Moscow may very well reject a Ukrainian proposal to talk without preconditions, Kyiv could leave the offer on the table and would be no worse off having done so. Secondly, whoever is poised to take over the White House, the U.S. will remain the country best placed to lead, with Kyiv, on defining a strategy that enables Ukraine’s negotiating position to be effectively bolstered by its backers even if the battlefield situation does not improve. That will require more candid talks with Ukraine and its European supporters in order to forge consensus on bottom lines ahead of any talks with Russia. Those discussions would have to happen behind closed doors, they might strain the coalition and nothing guarantees Russia will agree to whatever emerges. But without them, a sustainable deal is even less likely.

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Nearly three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, both armies are worn down. Casualty counts number in the hundreds of thousands, vast quantities of military equipment have been lost and much in Ukraine lies destroyed. Europe’s largest land war since World War II continues to pose dangers of escalation into a direct confrontation between Western countries – which back Ukraine with military and economic aid – and Russia, the world’s largest nuclear power. After failing in its initial blitzkrieg, Russia is now aiming to prevail through brute force and numerical advantage. In Kyiv, there is a growing understanding that a ceasefire is more realistic than a battlefield victory, though Ukrainians are opposed to any agreement that does not contain security guarantees to deter a renewed Russian attack. With a crucial election looming in the U.S., Ukraine and its other Western backers face the challenge of defining a way forward that can prepare the ground for eventual talks that could bring a sustainable peace and blunt the impact of concessions Kyiv may have to make.

War of Exhaustion

In recent months, Russia looks to have gained the upper hand in what has become a war of exhaustion. Russian forces continue to creep forward in eastern Ukraine, amid fierce clashes that have inflicted heavy losses on both sides. Ukrainian drone and missile strikes have pushed Russia’s Black Sea fleet out of Crimean anchorages, but neither that success nor the Ukrainian army’s August incursion into Russia’s Kursk region has shifted the strategic balance. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone attacks have shattered Ukraine’s power generation capacity, forcing Ukrainians to face another tough winter ahead.

So far, neither side looks strong enough to achieve a decisive breakthrough. Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk appeared to flip the script on the Russian army as an unstoppable steamroller, but it has not put Kyiv in a significantly more advantageous position. Indeed, several months on, Russia continues to grind ahead in Ukraine itself, with glide bombs, artillery barrages and frontal assaults. The Kremlin’s calculation is that in a war of attrition, it has the advantage, thanks to its larger population and Ukraine’s material dependence on its Western backers. Thus, though it has redeployed forces to counter the Kursk incursion, Moscow believes that it will eventually compel Kyiv to sue for peace.

Ukrainian leaders recognise the challenges. They understand that their country cannot sustain such a war without indefinite, uninterrupted military and economic support from the West. The lengthy delay of the $60 billion aid package that finally passed the U.S. Congress in April was a stark reminder of Kyiv’s dependence and the dangers it poses. Ukrainians also understand that, absent a miracle, they will not regain control of all their territory by force. War fatigue runs high in Ukraine. In Kyiv, high-ranking generals have gone so far as to seriously discuss patently fake “Russian peace plans” spread on social media. In conversations with Crisis Group, Ukrainian officials have referred to the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War (but did not result in a formal peace treaty) as a potential model for ending the fighting.

Whispers of a potential ceasefire began over the summer in Kyiv, even if Ukrainians avoided speaking openly about the prospect to avoid being labelled defeatist. “People far from the battlefield are patriotic in public, but in private they say: ‘When is the end?’”, an observer in Kyiv told Crisis Group. A poll commissioned by the Ukrainian newspaper Dzerkalo Tyzhnia in late June found that 44 per cent of Ukrainians believed the time had come for peace talks with Russia, while 35 per cent disagreed and 21 per cent did not know. At the same time, 61 per cent of respondents said Ukraine should not make concessions and 66 per cent believed in a military victory. Crisis Group’s interviews with political and military leaders suggest a new willingness to envisage some form of pause in fighting, reflecting the general sense of exhaustion.

[Ukrainians] see a ceasefire as a way to take a break, rebuild and fight again until they can compel Moscow to rethink its own staying power in the war.

None of the above means that Ukrainians are contemplating surrender. They see a ceasefire as a way to take a break, rebuild and fight again until they can compel Moscow to rethink its own staying power in the war. In the spring, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a new mobilisation law to ramp up the intake of new troops, though it is far from clear that it will bring enough well-trained reinforcements to the eastern front lines, particularly given the extra demand created by the Kursk offensive. Some Ukrainians also see a break in the fighting as an opportunity to reset domestic politics. Zelenskyy has amassed enormous power, sidelining parliament and his political opponents. While he remains Ukraine’s most trusted politician, Zelenskyy has seen his ratings fall amid accusations of corruption and frustration with the conduct of the war. Behind closed doors, recriminations abound regarding Zelenskyy’s pre-invasion preparations. For now, martial law prohibits new elections. But a ceasefire would permit the return of voting, open competition and the possibility of political renewal, a prospect not a few Ukrainians would welcome.

That time appears to be working against Kyiv might seem like an incentive to talk sooner rather than later. Assuming that Russia’s advance in the east grinds on, Ukraine’s negotiating position will likely worsen, all the more so if Western support flags. But most officials in Kyiv believe that the best deal they could get under current conditions would be disastrous for Ukraine. Thus far, they see a Kremlin uninterested in compromise, with Russian President Vladimir Putin believing he can prevail militarily or at least waiting to see if the next U.S. administration might open new opportunities. Putin’s recent statements suggest that at best he would condition talks on major concessions from Kyiv and at worst force a deal that would be tantamount to Ukraine’s surrender. Most Ukrainians understand that for the Kremlin, the war is not about the annexation of one Ukrainian region or another but about locking the whole country into Russia’s sphere of influence. They see little reason to negotiate on those terms.

Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula

Mirroring Ukrainians’ desire for peace yet unwillingness to compromise, Zelenskyy has banned talks with Putin, while promoting his own vision of negotiations. In 2022, he laid out Ukraine’s demands in a ten-point “peace formula” that looks more like the terms of a Russian surrender. His demands include the complete return of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, the withdrawal of all Russian troops, the prosecution of Russian war crimes and the payment of reparations. In June, Ukraine and Switzerland convened an international conference at an Alpine resort. It was the culmination of a series of meetings initiated by Kyiv that aimed to showcase global support for Zelenskyy’s peace formula. The president’s powerful chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, bypassed Ukraine’s foreign ministry and coordinated the meetings directly out of his office.

The Swiss summit brought together more than 90 countries but failed to unite a global coalition behind Ukraine’s demands. The final communiqué mentioned only three – and arguably the least contentious – of Zelenskyy’s ten points: the importance of nuclear safety, food security and the return of prisoners. Key non-Western countries such as India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa did not sign the document. China and Brazil, which had jointly presented their own proposal for peace talks in May, did not even attend. (Brazil sent only an observer.)

Speaking on the eve of the Swiss peace conference, to which Russia was not invited, Putin said the Kremlin was “ready to get down to negotiations as soon as tomorrow”. He then listed two conditions for talks: first, that Ukrainian troops withdraw completely from four Ukrainian regions – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia – that Russia claims as its own but does not fully control; and secondly, that Ukraine renounce its ambitions to join NATO. After Ukraine’s Kursk offensive, Putin said there could be no question of negotiations with Kyiv.

Stumbling Blocks Old and New

For all the challenges facing Ukraine, political and military leaders in Kyiv repeat the time-worn phrase that “all wars end in talks”. While talks remain unlikely now, the demands listed by Zelenskyy and Putin should be seen as opening positions for the day when the two sides are ready to come to the table and strike a bargain.

Inevitably the balance on the battlefield will determine what peace looks like. But despite the two sides’ seeming intransigence, the main points up for negotiation have been clear for some time. In the early days of the 2022 invasion, Ukraine and Russia attempted to hammer out an end to hostilities in a series of negotiations held in Belarus and Istanbul. A draft treaty dated 15 April 2022, which is the closest the two sides have come to an agreement, shows what will likely be on the table in any future negotiations. At the time, both sides were poised to make serious concessions: Ukraine was prepared to become a “permanently neutral state” – ie, abandon its hopes of NATO membership – and to leave the status of Crimea and other Ukrainian territories controlled by Russia for later discussion; Russia appeared ready to accept Ukraine’s membership in the European Union and direct talks between Putin and Zelenskyy, despite the Russian leader’s refusal to meet his Ukrainian counterpart before the invasion.

The 2022 talks also revealed sticking points. A wide gulf separated what the two sides were prepared to accept with regard to the size of Ukraine’s post-conflict military. Ukraine also rejected the notion that Russia would be a “guarantor state” of Ukrainian security, a seemingly contradictory role given Russia’s position as an invader. The April draft treaty also listed Britain, China, France and the U.S. as possible guarantors, though these outside countries were not consulted about the text or their prospective roles. Kyiv insisted on guarantors having the right to use military force to stop any future aggression against Ukraine, while Moscow demanded a veto over any such decision. That last demand apparently caused the Ukrainians to lose interest in continuing talks.

Since the 2022 negotiations, Ukraine and Russia have become more entrenched in their stances, after bloody battles with hundreds of thousands of casualties. The fate of Russian-occupied territories is now all the more contentious. Putin’s September 2023 declaration that the entire Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are integral parts of Russia, even though the Russian army holds only parts of them, may be an obstacle to freezing the front lines where they stand. Discussions on limiting the size of Ukraine’s army will also be more difficult as the Ukrainian military has transformed into Europe’s most combat-hardened fighting force. Seemingly widespread Russian war crimes in occupied parts of Ukraine, as well as Russia’s targeting of civilian infrastructure, have made Ukrainians more determined to seek reparations and justice.

Core Challenges

A core challenge to any future agreement is whether it can hold over time, rather than just give the parties an opportunity to regroup for another round of fighting. For Ukraine, the victim of an unprovoked Russian invasion, the ability to deter future aggression by Russia will be crucial. As the 2022 talks suggest, Moscow wants the Ukrainian military to be significantly weaker than Kyiv would accept, but Ukraine cannot permit a reduction of forces that would leave it incapable of defending itself should hostilities resume.

The question of Ukraine’s relationship with NATO has also become more fraught. If Kyiv was ready to consider neutrality at the beginning of the invasion, the war’s brutality has forged a broad consensus in Ukraine that only NATO membership can prevent another attack. The Kremlin, however, views Ukraine’s renunciation of its NATO aspirations as a main war aim. At the same time, the alliance itself is divided over letting in Ukraine. Overall, NATO members have been moving toward accepting some form of Ukrainian membership, with countries such as the Baltic states, France and Poland offering vocal support for Ukraine’s joining. The U.S. and Germany regard that option more warily, seeing it as a liability that could draw them into direct conflict with Russia, while Hungary and Slovakia, whose leaders are sympathetic to the Kremlin, oppose NATO membership outright. Some Western officials, including members of the U.S. administration, propose that just those areas of Ukraine still under Kyiv’s control enter the alliance, a prospect that in itself assumes the country will not regain large portions of its territory any time soon.

Ukraine’s experience of the Minsk agreements signed in the wake of Russia’s initial 2014 invasion informs the thinking of many officials in Kyiv and the imperative they see of gaining sufficient leverage to stop Russia from dictating terms. An adviser to the presidential administration described Zelenskyy’s peace formula as a way for Ukraine to take back agency by defining how it envisions peace. Kyiv, the adviser said, does not want to repeat the experience of the internationally brokered Minsk agreements, which Ukraine had no choice but to sign because of its disadvantage on the battlefield.

The challenge, Ukrainians recognise, is that Kyiv is not in much of a position to shape any agreement’s terms.

The challenge, Ukrainians recognise, is that Kyiv is not in much of a position to shape any agreement’s terms. The Swiss conference, which was more an effort to shore up the world’s support for Ukraine’s vision for peace than to negotiate, was mostly unsuccessful in doing even that. Zelenskyy’s government has since postponed plans to hold a follow-up summit in November that would include Russia. But few believe that such a gathering can take place at all, primarily because of Russia’s unwillingness to show up. One diplomat in Kyiv went as far as to call the Zelenskyy initiative “a vanity project”. Another described it as an exercise in “cheerleading for Ukraine”. Still, even after the Kursk incursion, the Ukrainian administration has insisted the next summit is still in preparation.

Other leaders of varying clout and seriousness have floated their own peace plans. In July, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Europe’s harshest critic of military aid for Ukraine, embarked on a self-proclaimed peace mission, first visiting Zelenskyy and then travelling to meet Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump. After the European Union distanced itself from his freelance shuttle diplomacy, the Hungarian leader responded that negotiations were impossible without “significant external involvement”. Orbán further reported that Trump, should he win the November election, was ready to act as a peace broker “immediately” based on “detailed and well-founded plans”. Orbán later threw his support behind a six-point proposal from China and Brazil. At the UN General Assembly in September, Zelenskyy rejected the proposal, which makes no mention of Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, even as China and Brazil issued a joint communiqué with eleven other countries calling for a “comprehensive and lasting settlement” to the conflict.

The November elections in the U.S. and the prospect of Trump’s return to the White House cast a long shadow. Both Kyiv and Moscow see the vote as crucial to the war’s trajectory. Zelenskyy has explained the attack on Kursk as part of a “victory plan” he presented to U.S. President Joe Biden, Trump and the Democratic presidential nominee, Vice President Kamala Harris, on a trip to the U.S. in September. A Democratic victory likely promises continued U.S. support as long as the administration can maintain Congressional backing, though Harris might seek an end to the war more actively than Biden has. Some Ukrainian officials describe the prospect of a Trump presidency as disastrous because of the open admiration for Putin and disdain for Ukraine that Trump displayed during his first term. But others see in Trump’s potential return an opportunity to break the deadlock with Russia – perhaps because they hope a deal imposed by Washington would relieve them of direct responsibility and make the U.S. a guarantor of its success.

Despite his hostile statements about Ukraine and vows to force Kyiv into a deal with Moscow, it remains unclear how Trump would act on his promises. In June, two Trump advisers presented the Republican candidate with a plan in which the U.S. would get the warring sides to the table by threatening Putin with increased military aid for Ukraine while telling Zelenskyy he would lose U.S. assistance if he declined to join the talks. Key elements of the plan are familiar: a ceasefire along the front lines, wherever they stand at the time, and postponement of Ukraine’s NATO membership. Crisis Group has heard similar ideas from Ukrainian analysts, among others. It is not evident how the plan resolves the core dilemma of ensuring that any ceasefire deal is sustainable and protects Ukraine from another Russian assault. Trump has not publicly endorsed such an approach. If he prevails in November, he says, he would start work on a peace settlement even before his inauguration in January.

Toward a Plan B for Peace

Although time may be on Russia’s side, Ukraine does have factors working in its favour. Russia’s advances in 2024 have been limited and extremely costly in terms of personnel and equipment. The Russian Black Sea fleet no longer plays a decisive role in the war. Ukraine continues to strike military and economic targets deep inside Russia. The cross-border incursion into Kursk demonstrated the thinness of Russia’s lines and holes in its military intelligence. If Kyiv’s mobilisation efforts begin to bear fruit and Western countries continue to deliver promised military aid, such as the recent addition of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine’s arsenal, Kyiv’s ability to prevent further Russian advances might eventually lead Moscow to seek a compromise.

Although genuine peace talks seem a long way off, Kyiv could announce that it is willing to talk to Moscow without preconditions. Such an announcement might be a way to break out of the strictures of the maximalist positions that both sides are articulating but which both presumably know would be abandoned in any genuine talks. Ukraine’s invitation to talk would put the onus to respond on Russia, which has insisted it is open to negotiations even while demanding major concessions as preconditions. Importantly, it would signal to the rest of the world that Ukraine is pursuing diplomacy and might give non-Western countries more reason to help push for an end to the war that does not leave Ukraine vulnerable to further Russian advances.

Western states, even while arming Ukraine, can also do more to lay the groundwork. They should back a Ukrainian proposal to meet Russian officials without preconditions. Western diplomats might also work behind the scenes to probe existing channels to Moscow and help activate potential intermediaries to lay the groundwork for talks. Crucially, Western capitals could make clear that negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, if they show progress, could be linked to talks on other, related subjects of interest to the Kremlin – mainly European security, including the positioning of NATO troops and weapons.

If Russians come to the table willing to deal, Ukraine and its partners will need a plan to mitigate the costs of the concessions that ... seem unavoidable.

If Russians come to the table willing to deal, Ukraine and its partners will need a plan to mitigate the costs of the concessions that – barring an extraordinary revival of Ukraine’s battlefield fortunes – seem unavoidable. A negotiated deal between Ukraine and Russia would, for example, contain a component on land. It seems almost inevitable that Ukraine will have to accept – as it appears to have done in the spring of 2022 – at least the temporary loss of land that Russia already holds. Any deal that cedes (de facto, not de jure) control of land might be more acceptable if it allows the inhabitants to move, if they so choose, to Ukrainian-held territory rather than live under Russian occupation. Indeed, the phrase “people, not territory” is heard in Kyiv more and more often. The most obvious way to define the line of separation would be along the battle lines at the time of the ceasefire.

The main challenge to talks, if the spring 2022 negotiations are any precedent, would lie in disputes over the Ukrainian army and its security cooperation with Western countries, including potential NATO membership. Unless Ukraine can defend itself or otherwise deter further Russian advances, it is hard to see how any agreement would stick. Beyond Kyiv, other European capitals see any deal that leaves Ukraine defenceless as a menace to the security of the continent as a whole and believe that absent strong deterrence, Russian expansionism is unlikely to stop in the areas of Ukraine it holds.

Ukraine’s NATO aspirations will no doubt be a point of contention – perhaps more so than they were during the spring 2022 round of talks. For Moscow, the possibility of Ukraine’s NATO membership has remained a stated red line, and Kyiv appears to have been prepared to declare neutrality in the earlier negotiations. But Ukraine’s position has hardened since, like that of its Western partners, and it will not want to back away from this goal a priori. While NATO is unlikely to accept the membership of the whole of Ukraine while it is at war with Russia, the U.S. and other allies are increasingly considering scenarios in which part of the country joins.

Even that would be anathema to Moscow, and there are practical challenges, too. It is hard to see how membership for part of Ukraine – often called the West German model – would work absent a clearly delineated front. That could come about only through a ceasefire and an agreement with Moscow as to where the lines lie. Yet Russia, which in any case shows little sign of compromise, would have even less incentive to settle on demarcation if NATO membership for a rump Ukraine would be the end result. Furthermore, NATO membership, even if Hungarian or Slovakian resistance could be overcome, seems unlikely to get through the U.S. Senate. Western powers might promise Ukraine eventual membership in the form of an invitation. But given that Ukraine already has an invitation – first articulated at NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit – it is unclear what purpose reiterating that commitment would serve.

The size and armaments of Ukraine’s future military will likely be among the fiercest points of contention.

The size and armaments of Ukraine’s future military will likely be among the fiercest points of contention, given Putin’s original war aim to “demilitarise” Ukraine and the disagreements that marked the spring 2022 talks. Even with security guarantees, Ukraine will want – and most Western partners will see a necessity in – a motivated, well-equipped Ukrainian army as part of its defence. One option might be for Ukraine to keep the right to muster a capable reserve force, rather than maintain a large standing army, to underscore its defensive posture. Military cooperation with Western countries will be contentious, too. Ukraine has signed two dozen bilateral security agreements and could use them as bargaining chips since they are largely of symbolic value. While insisting on their right to continue to work with the Ukrainians, Western countries can forego things that Moscow claims to fear – and that no Western state has actually proposed – such as permanent bases on Ukrainian territory.

Ukraine could offer sweeteners to Russia that come at relatively low cost to Ukraine but would allow Moscow to call the deal a success. For example, Kyiv could offer to grant the Russian language an official status in accordance with minority-language norms in European countries. Kyiv could also agree to pass legislation further limiting already illegal Nazi symbols and speech. Nazis in reality count few followers among Ukrainians, but these and similar steps would help enable Putin to claim that the country has been “denazified”. It could leave the international justice system to pursue Russian war criminals, even as Ukraine’s own courts continue to gather evidence and seek ways to recognise the suffering of victims.

Finally, Ukraine and its backers need to plan for Ukraine’s political future. Any deal with Russia will feed recrimination. The return of more contentious politics and press freedom will bring into the open anger that now roils under the surface. Any compromise with Putin would provide fodder for new resentment. Veterans, volunteers and families of war dead could demand retribution, raising risks of unrest and perhaps even violence. Kyiv must develop ways in advance to resolve these painful disputes with a maximum of transparency and inclusion.

Source: International Crisis Group

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National winter cereal production holds steady despite summer drought

In September 2024, the eastern front line remained a focal point, with heavy fighting reported in the Pokrovsk sector. In Russian-occupied territories, an escalation occurred on September 15 when a series of coordinated missile strikes targeted key agricultural hubs in the Donetsk region, destroying storage facilities and disrupting local food supplies.

Additionally, on September 22, Russian forces imposed stricter curfews and road blockages in occupied areas, further limiting the movement of goods and humanitarian aid. Russia has also intensified its air campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, with recent attacks targeting power plants in the northeastern Sumy region. On September 10, a major power plant in central Ukraine was damaged by a In missile strike, leading to widespread power outages that affected food storage and processing facilities. The extensive damage to Ukraine’s energy network from months of attacks has led experts and officials to warn of unavoidable power cuts this winter. Russian air assaults on urban centers such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kryvyi Rih, and Poltava have also caused significant destruction, hitting apartment buildings and a military academy.

The escalating attacks in eastern Ukraine continue to impact civilians severely. Ongoing conflict has not only disrupted humanitarian operations but also caused new waves of displacement in Donetsk, Kherson, and Kharkiv oblasts. According to OCHA, humanitarian partners continue to provide essential support, such as food, cash transfers, farming inputs, water, and sanitation services.

This comes as the cold winter weather is fast approaching. During the month of August, over 1.2 million people received solid fuel and repair materials for conflict-damaged homes, and other non-food essential items in preparation for the winter. As winter begins in October, populations of highest concern remain displaced families, non-displaced individuals living in substandard and war-damaged houses, returnee families, disabled persons, older persons, single-headed households, and those with chronic medical conditions.

Winter crop harvesting in Ukraine concluded two to three weeks earlier than usual due to unusually high temperatures. Wheat production reached around 21.5 million metric tons, close to last year's levels. While spring weather in Ukraine is typically favorable for crop production, this year’s abnormally low precipitation and high temperatures have led to severe water shortages, affecting over 65 percent of the country. 

However, national-level wheat and barley production is expected to remain below five-year average levels, largely linked to farmers switching to oilseeds, lower yields in calendar year 2024, and declines in area-planted related to the Russian occupation of territories in eastern Ukraine.

In September, Ukrainian grain exports remained near pre-war levels. As of September 18, 2024, Ukrainian grain exports have reached nearly 10 million tons since the beginning of the 2024/25 marketing year in July 2024. This represents a 52.3 percent increase compared to the same period in the previous marketing year. These trends indicate a recovery in Ukraine’s grain export capacity despite the ongoing challenges posed by the conflict. In September, a new system of minimum export prices for key grain and oilseed shipments was signed to combat ongoing price distortions in the domestic grain market and tax avoidance strategies that hurt the government’s key source of external revenue.

Additionally, an agreement was reached on the maximum grain export volumes for the 2024/2025 marketing year, setting the limit for wheat and a mixture of wheat and rye at 16.2 million tons. This agreement aims to maintain domestic food security and affordability, with potential adjustments to the export limit in January 2025.

Source: FEWS NET

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Empowering Communities: Vital Rental Assistance Support for Displaced Ukrainian Families

Given continued shelling, extensive damage to over 1.4 million homes, an estimated $10.5 billion in damage and losses to energy infrastructure, and the exhaustion of coping strategies and savings, significant multi-sector needs are expected to continue for families on the frontline and internally displaced persons (IDPs) throughout 2024 (World Bank, Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment 2023).

CVA has been a pillar of CORE’s response across the region, including rental assistance. Lvivska Oblast has one of the highest numbers of IDPs in Western oblasts, hosting nearly 175,000 IDPs, many of whom settled in collective centers (IOM Internal Displacement Report, Round 15). Protection risks are higher in collective centers, a concern given 61% of adult IDPs are women, 21% are 60+ years old, and 21% are children. Rental assistance was the critical shelter need identified by the Winterization plan released by the Protection Cluster Ukraine in 2022.

This learning brief focuses specifically on lessons drawn from CORE’s Ukraine Humanitarian Fund (UHF)-supported rental assistance program to236 households (773 individuals total), which was implemented from November 2023 to June 2024 in Lviv and Lvivska oblast, and includes recommendations for scaling vital aspects of these programs.

These lessons include:

• The program model: The program model was comprehensive, encompassing cash assistance for rent, linkages for program participants with realtors and thus landlords, and multi-sector referrals

• Delivery mechanism: Bank transfers are secure, efficient, direct and quick. This method is protected by the banking system, which minimizes the risk of loss and enhances accountability and transparency, simplifying logistical processes and reducing risks such as theft or coercion.

• The transfer value: The current transfer value generally meets household needs for mid-range housing in Ukraine, adequately covering the average rental costs. This flexibility allowed households to receive reimbursement based on the actual costs of their accommodation, ensuring past expenses were covered.

• Program duration: Six months of rental assistance is effective for providing support to individuals facing significant challenges, such as loss of housing or low income, as it allows them to stabilize and start rebuilding their lives. This period enables program participants to allocate their ownfunds towards other essential needs like healthcare, childcare, and livelihoods, thereby enhancing household resilience.

• Outreach, enrollment and selection: Utilizing social networks and messaging platforms has proven to be an effective method for communicating with IDPs, allowing for the rapid dissemination of information and collection of feedback.

• Risk mitigation: Having piloted both approaches (reimbursing rental assistance payments and distributing rental assistance upfront,) CORE has concluded that reimbursing rental payments helps ensure that funds are used as intended, reducing operational risks as well as risks of renter exploitation by landlords.

CONCLUSION

Rental assistance for IDPs has been crucial in helping them adapt to host communities and ensure their essential shelter needs are met. Moving forward, ensuring Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) based on updated cluster recommendations, refining selection criteria, and exploring new methods of outreach and communication will be essential for scaling the program’s impact.

In addition, increasing the transfer value to account for spikes in utility costs during the winter season and enabling flexible spending across rental and utility objectives will further support households’ choice. Additionally, integrating a more systematic approach.

These steps will further strengthen the program’s effectiveness in supporting IDPs and promoting their long-term stability and well-being.

Source: CORE

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Health Cluster Partner Response: Winter Preparedness (Aug - Sept 2024)

The war in Ukraine has severely impacted the health and energy infrastructure, leaving vulnerable populations at heightened risk as the winter season sets in. Adding to direct attacks on health facilities, targeted strikes on energy infrastructure have disrupted power supplies, increasing the risk of excess cold-related morbidity and mortality while disrupting the delivery of health services and storage of essential thermosensitive supplies such as vaccines and insulin.

To assess the winter preparedness of health care facilities across Ukraine, WHO and the Health Cluster conducted a joint Energy Assessment, gathering data from 1,039 facilities. This assessment examined energy supply (e.g., connections to the national grid and availability of alternative energy sources), heating and water supply systems, ventilation infrastructure, energy-related challenges, and risk mitigation strategies. Key findings from this assessment were presented to partners during an ad-hoc meeting on September 18, providing evidence-based insights for planning*.

 According to the WHO Ukraine 2024-2025 winter risk assessment, the entire population is exposed to cold-related health risks, as temperatures drop below -10°C. High-risk groups include older adults, young children, pregnant women, people with disabilities, and those with pre-existing health conditions.

Vulnerability is compounded for displaced, and people experiencing economic hardship and homelessness, particularly in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolayiv regions. These areas are experiencing the highest public health risks, as they have already been severely impacted by the hostilities and mass displacement.

Response

In line with the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, Health Cluster partners, in close collaboration with the Ministry of Health, are driving preparedness efforts outlined in the Winter Response Plan. By mobilizing essential resources, strengthening health facilities and infrastructure, enhancing the capacity of healthcare workers, and engaging communities to prevent cold-related health issues, health partners seek to mitigate the risks associated with winter in Ukraine.

As of 30th September 2024, Health Cluster partners have completed the first round of winter preparedness efforts, supporting 21 health facilities. These efforts included the donation of generators, the repair and upgrade of heating systems, the provision of backup boilers, and the installation of prefabricated units to serve as temporary health centers. Ongoing activities include health facility needs assessments, energy capacity evaluations, and minor rehabilitation works to ensure sustained support and readiness for the upcoming winter.

Sources: Health Cluster, WHO 

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Spotlight on settlements reporting receiving less or no assistance (August 2024)

Given the dynamic nature of the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, regular monitoring is essential to understand the profile and severity of humanitarian needs in settlements close to the frontline and border with Russia, and to ensure that humanitarian response plans remain aligned with the situation on the ground. Since Round 17 (July 2024), Humanitarian Situation Monitoring collects information on the reported amount of assistance assessed settlements are receiving compared to neighbouring settlements.

This factsheet provides an overview of settlements where KIs reported receiving less or no assistance, what humanitarian needs residents of these settlements had; and for other settlements, gaps in the assistance provided.

Data collection ran from August 19 to August 30, 2024 in 395 assessed settlements 0-100km from the frontline and border with Russia.

This article focuses on the effectiveness of the assistance provided, in terms of food, drinking water, housing, and healthcare assistance. Further details on the levels of need in multisectoral and sectoral areas are included in the full Factsheet.

Source: IMC

Ukraine’s Zelenskyy says North Korean troops are poised to join the war, cancels UN chief’s visit

North Korean troops are poised to be deployed by Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine as early as this weekend, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed Friday.

Western officials have warned that North Korean units joining the fight would stoke the almost three-year war and bring geopolitical consequences as far away as the Indo-Pacific region.

The possibility has alarmed leaders and deepened diplomatic tensions.

White House national security spokesman John Kirby said Friday that the top national security advisers for the United States, Japan and South Korea met and “expressed grave concern” about North Korea’s troop deployments for potential use with Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine.

Kirby said that the national security advisers from the three countries “call on Russia and the DPRK to cease these actions that only serve to expand the security implications of Russia’s brutal and illegal war beyond Europe and into the Indo-Pacific.”

Kirby said the U.S. government did not have firm intelligence assessments on where the troops were going “but we believe it is certainly possible” and “perhaps even likely” that some of the North Korean troops would be deployed to the Kursk region of Russia, where Ukraine has held some territory since capturing it in August. But he cautioned that he did not know in what capacity and to what purpose the North Korean troops would be deployed.

A senior official in the Ukrainian presidential office told The Associated Press on Friday that Zelenskyy had canceled a planned visit to Kyiv by U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about the matter, said the visit was supposed to come after this week’s summit in the Russian city of Kazan of the BRICS bloc of developing economies, which Guterres attended.

A photograph of Guterres shaking hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the summit triggered an outcry in Ukraine.

Zelenskyy, in a post on Telegram, said Ukrainian intelligence had determined that “the first North Korean military will be used by Russia in combat zones” between Sunday and Monday.

He said on Telegram that the deployment was “an obvious escalating move by Russia.” He didn’t provide any further details, including where the North Korean soldiers may be sent.

Russia has been conducting a ferocious summer campaign along the eastern front in Ukraine, gradually compelling Kyiv to surrender ground. But Russia has struggled to push Ukrainian forces out of its Kursk border region following an incursion almost three months ago.

The deployment of North Korean forces under a military pact between Moscow and Pyongyang brings a new dimension to the conflict, which is Europe’s biggest war since World War II and has cost tens of thousands of lives on both sides, including many civilians.

The U.S. said Wednesday that 3,000 North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia and are training at several locations, calling the move very serious.

Zelenskyy said a week ago that his government has intelligence information that 10,000 troops from North Korea are being readied to join Russian forces fighting against his country. He said that a third nation wading into the hostilities would turn the conflict into a “world war.”

Source: AP News

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British PM says Russia risks global food security in Ukraine

Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has warned that Russia is stepping up attacks on Ukrainian ports in the Prime Black Sea – delaying the export of agricultural produce, including aid intended for Palestinians caught up in the conflict with Israel.

During several days of strikes in early October, Russian weapons hit at least four cargo ships, including one reportedly carrying 6,000 tonnes of corn.

Sir Keir said that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was willing “to gamble on global food security in his attempts to force Ukraine into submission”.

The prime minister's remarks came as he travels to the Pacific Island of Samoa for a meeting of Commonwealth heads of government.

During several days of strikes, Russian missile strikes on the Odesa region hit a Panamanian-registered ship and a Palau-flagged cargo ship were also attacked, killing one person on-board. Several people in the southern city of Zaporizhzhia were injured as 29 homes were destroyed and pictures released by regional officials show a giant crater in the mud, with bricks and wood strewn all around.

A wave of strikes on Ukraine's Black Sea ports coincided with a European tour by President Volodymyr Zelensky - who visited leaders in London, Paris, Rome and Berlin. But Sir Keir pointed out the increasing number of Russian attacks coincided with harvest season.

Despite the war, Ukraine is still a significant supplier of agricultural goods.

But British intelligence suggests a growth in what officials call Russian "risk appetite” when attacking Ukrainian ports – with grain ships becoming what is described as “collateral damage” in Russia’s campaign.

Sir Keir said the “indiscriminate attacks” were “harming millions of vulnerable people across Africa, Asia and the Middle East”.

According to Ukrainian figures, more than 20 civilian ships have now been damaged in Russian attacks since the start of the war in 2022. Grain silos and other port infrastructure have been badly damaged too.

However, Ukraine has succeeded in creating a maritime corridor to ensure the safety of grain exports, after Moscow pulled out of a Black Sea grain deal last year. Some 962,000 tonnes of grain were exported in the first ten days of October, according to the agriculture ministry in Kyiv - double the volume shipped in the same period last year.

Speaking to journalists travelling with him to Samoa, Sir Keir said Russia’s recent recruitment of troops from North Korea was “an embarrassing and desperate act. On Tuesday, the British government announced that it would give Ukraine an extra £2.26bn using the profits from Russian assets held in Europe. The one-off payment is an addition to £3bn already pledged by the government to fund Ukraine’s war effort.

So far, the UK has given more than £12bn in military aid and has promised to match that level of support in the future. Announcing the funding, Chancellor Rachel Reeves said it showed the UK's support for Ukraine was "unwavering and will remain for as long as it takes".

Source: BBC

UK to boost Ukraine funding using £2bn from Russian assets

The UK government will give an extra £2.26bn ($2.93bn) to Ukraine, using the profits from Russian assets held in Europe.

It forms Britain’s contribution to a £38bn ($50bn) fund announced in June by members of the G7 group of leading economies.

Defence Secretary John Healey said the new money will help Ukraine bolster its frontline military equipment. He described it as "turning the proceeds of Putin’s own corrupt regime against him, by putting it into the hands of Ukraine". Chancellor Rachel Reeves said the aim was to release the money as quickly as possible.

The funds will be made in the form of a loan – with the UK recouping the cost from sanctions on Russian assets – "within the correct legal framework".  Reeves made it clear that the UK was not confiscating sovereign Russian assets in Europe, but using the profits and interest accrued from them.

Other G7 countries have pledged to do the same and are expected to finalise their contributions in the coming weeks.

The payments to Ukraine are expected to be made in tranches, rather than all at once. Some nations expect some of the money to go towards Ukraine’s reconstruction. But the UK government has said it is up to Kyiv on how it spends the UK’s contribution.

The chancellor and defence secretary briefed reporters on the announcement sitting side by side. Reeves said it showed the UK's support for Ukraine was "unwavering and will remain for as long as it takes". Their appearance together might also signal a positive relationship ahead of next week’s Budget, when the government will outline its spending plans on public services such as health, schools and police.

Reeves was asked about defence spending and repeated that the government had committed to spending 2.5% of GDP – though without a timetable. The chancellor said she was not going to discuss details of the forthcoming budget.

Source: BBC

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World Bank Group Donor Financing Mechanisms for Supporting Ukraine

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, the World Bank Group has facilitated critical financing from donors to support Ukraine. The World Bank Group offers a range of trust funds, financial intermediaries, guarantees, co- and parallel financing, and other financial instruments to help the Government of Ukraine sustain essential public services, rebuild critical infrastructure, support the private sector, and more with needs identified in the first, second, and third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments for Ukraine.

World Bank

Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF)

URTF is a coordinated financing and support mechanism to assist the Government of Ukraine in (i) sustaining its administrative and service delivery capacity and conducting relief efforts and (ii) planning and implementing recovery, resilient reconstruction, and reform agenda. URTF is supporting Framework Projects—emergency operations that mobilize partner resources through an innovative and flexible design. The projects reflect Ukraine’s relief needs outlined in the RDNAs and are designed to be adaptable to events on the ground, scalable to integrate additional financing, and rapidly make an impact. The trust fund also plays a critical role in Ukraine’s path to reforms, as it supports activities that help implement reforms outlined in the Government’s Reforms Matrix, such as through the LEARN program for results.

To date, URTF is supporting the following projects:

• Agriculture Recovery Inclusive Support Emergency (ARISE)

• Health Enhancement and Lifesaving (HEAL)

• Housing Repair for People's Empowerment (HOPE)

• Lifting Education Access and Resilience in Times of Need (LEARN)

• Repairing Essential Logistics Infrastructure and Network Connectivity (RELINC)

• Restoration Project of Winterization and Energy Resources Ukraine (REPOWER)

Learn about the impact that ARISE and HEAL are already having on lives and livelihoods across Ukraine.

Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE)

The PEACE in Ukraine project is contributing to sustaining the Government's administrative and service delivery capacity, as well as essential services and core government functions. It covers expenditures incurred for the government, education, and healthcare services; first responders' wages; social assistance payments—supported through grants from a dedicated MDTF, IBRD/IDA financing, and donor guarantees. Learn more about PEACE here.

Advancing Needed Credit Enhancement for Ukraine Trust Fund (ADVANCE Ukraine TF)

The ADVANCE Ukraine TF is aimed at providing IBRD lending credit enhancement for projects and operations in Ukraine. It follows the World Bank’s bilateral shareholder guarantee framework and is financed through the issuance and deposit of promissory notes. To date, the Government of Japan has contributed $7 billion in promissory notes. The first $1.5 billion Ukraine Relief and Recovery Development Policy Loan was approved by the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors on June 29, 2023. Subsequent World Bank loans backed by credit enhancement from the ADVANCE Ukraine TF were made to support projects in housing, agriculture, social protection, and sustaining critical government services.

Ukraine Economic Resilience Action (ERA) Program

IFC’s Ukraine ERA Program will support projects during Russia's invasion of Ukraine and initial stages of reconstruction. The program will focus on the following strategic priorities: (1) sustaining economic activity and supplying essential goods; (2) supporting vital economic infrastructure; and (3) addressing the needs of displaced people and affected municipalities. IFC will deploy $2 billion over the next two years, including $1 billion of own capital and $1 billion from donors to mitigate risks. IFC will further crowd in additional private financing for an expected leveraging of donor financing by 3-4x across the portfolio. Since the invasion, IFC has provided financing of $1.6 billion, with $1.1 billion committed from its own account and $530 million mobilized. This financing will support business resilience, particularly in key sectors such as agribusiness, by providing working capital, trade finance, and risk sharing facilities. IFC will also underpin early recovery through support to critical infrastructure for energy, transport, municipal services, and housing. In parallel, for project development IFC will prepare leveraging backing from partners to maximize private capital mobilization for reconstruction.

As of end September 2024, IFC has raised $748 million from Switzerland, Netherlands, the UK, European Commission, France, Japan, and Belgium.

MIGA

Support to Ukraine’s Reconstruction and Economy Trust Fund (SURE TF)

The SURE TF , which was established with an anchor contribution from Japan, will enable MIGA’s guarantee issuance in Ukraine by leveraging up to $300 million of donor funding. During the ongoing invasion, MIGA will issue trade finance guarantees for Ukraine to import vital goods and equipment for infrastructure repairs, agricultural production, health service delivery, and preparation for winter. It will also provide Political Risk Insurance for international banks to facilitate access to finance, as well as liquidity support to Ukrainian businesses. Real sector projects will be considered selectively during the ongoing active conflict. After its partial or full cessation, MIGA will continue to support Ukraine by catalyzing foreign direct investment in the country’s energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture, services, and finance sectors.

To date, Japan has contributed a total of $25 million, Norway has contributed $22 million, the United Kingdom £20 million, and Belgium €1 million.

Source: World Bank