Weekly Update #72
July 17

General Figures

Refugees from Ukraine recorded across Europe 

5,949,500

Last updated July 11 2023

Refugees from Ukraine recorded beyond Europe

353,100

Last updated July 1 2023

Refugees from Ukraine recorded globally

6,302,600

Last updated July 11 2023

Source: UNHCR Operational Data Portal

Status of the Ukrainian Counteroffensive

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly made limited gains. Geolocated footage published on July 15 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains northwest of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1km in an unspecified area in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continued counteroffensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast area). Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in the Bakhmut area and are defending new positions on the flanks of Bakhmut against Russian ground attacks. Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated Zaliznyanske (13km north of Bakhmut), parts of heights near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and a fortified area west of Andriivka (10km south of Bakhmut). 

Russian President Vladimir Putin denied Ukrainian successes in the counteroffensive and claimed that Ukrainian forces have not been able to break through Russian defenses on July 16. Putin notably told a journalist that he would answer a question about further goals of the war if the journalist turned off the camera. Ukrainian forces have, however, advanced in southern Ukraine where Russian forces have prepared the most extensive fortifications. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4 to July 9, ISW calculated based on its own control of terrain data that Ukrainian forces liberated approximately 253 square kilometers of territory. (Ukrainian official accounts of the area liberated differ from ISW’s, almost certainly because Ukraine calculated its initial control of terrain differently. ISW is presenting its own figure of liberated land to make an apples-to-apples comparison of Russian and Ukrainian gains.)

Ukrainian officials indicated that extensive Russian minefields and shortages of Western mine clearing equipment have slowed the pace of Ukrainian advances in the counteroffensive. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi acknowledged in an interview with CNN published on July 14 that the tempo of counteroffensive operations is slower than expected citing “complex and dense minefields” in areas through which Ukrainian forces intend to move.

The Washington Post reported on July 15 that Russian forces heavily mined areas between five and 16 kilometers behind the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast, which has slowed Ukrainian advances and forced Ukrainian forces to conduct ground attacks with infantry rather than Western kit. An unnamed Ukrainian officer told the Washington Post that Russian forces have prioritized destroying more advanced mine-clearing systems over Leopard tanks. An unnamed senior Ukrainian official told the Washington Post that Ukraine received less than 15 percent of the quantity of mine clearing and engineering material it requested ahead of the counteroffensive with some equipment arriving only last week.

The New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukrainian military has adjusted its strategy to minimize Ukrainian casualties while continuing to attrit Russian forces, supporting ISW’s previous assessments. NYT reported that unnamed US and European officials estimated that Russian forces destroyed up to 20 percent of Ukraine’s Western-provided weaponry in the first two weeks of the counteroffensive. The NYT reported that officials stated that the rate of losses has dropped to 10 percent in the subsequent weeks due to a change in Ukrainian strategy. The NYT reported that the Ukrainian military has changed tactics to focus on wearing down Russian forces with artillery and long-range missiles instead of large-scale assaults, which is consistent with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s statement on July 14 that increased Ukrainian indirect fire can both pin down Russian forces and minimize Ukrainian casualties.  ISW previously assessed on July 4 that Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. Ukraine‘s military has likely been refining its counteroffensive strategy for weeks, and the larger effects of those adjustments are only just becoming clear to some observers. Ukraine will likely continue to adjust its strategy and execution throughout the counteroffensive to facilitate continued progress.

Insubordination withing the Leadership of the Russian Military

• The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military’s most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort. 

• Insubordination among commanders appears to be spreading to some of their soldiers.

• The Kremlin’s chronic disregard for the Russian chain of command is likely hindering Shoigu and Gerasimov in their attempts to suppress insubordination and establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine.

• The intensifying dynamic of insubordination among Russian commanders in Ukraine may prompt other commanders to oppose the Russian military leadership more overtly. 

• Russian commanders are likely setting information conditions to prevent the Russian MoD from punishing them for their insubordination by promoting narratives among Russian servicemembers along the front and thereby risking widespread demoralization.

• The Russian veteran and ultranationalist communities appear to be readily defending the commanders’ insubordination by amplifying defeatist discussions that may have direct effects on Russian servicemembers’ morale. 

• The apparent crisis in the Russian chain of command and the corresponding morale effects it may produce will likely degrade Russian capabilities to conduct tactical offensive operations that are critical to the Russian elastic defense in southern Ukraine. 

• The apparent Russian chain of command crisis threatens to demoralize the wider Russian war effort in Ukraine.

Russian authorities likely continue to forcibly integrate Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) dioceses into the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as part of a wider religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine. 

Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik announced on July 15 the incorporation of the Luhansk, Alchevsk, Severodonetsk, Starobilsk, and Rovenky UOC dioceses into the ROC. The ROC has already seized the Berdyansk and Prymorsk dioceses in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and a Russian news aggregator claimed that the Russian Ministry of Justice recently registered the Donetsk City and Horlivka dioceses as part of the ROC. The new round of forced integration of the UOC dioceses in occupied Luhansk Oblast followed a Ukrainian court ruling that the Head of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Metropolitan Pavel will go to a detention center instead of remaining under house arrest. Russian sources attempted to portray the integration of UOC dioceses into the ROC as a response to claimed Ukrainian religious suppression of a Kremlin-run ROC. The ROC has explicit links to the Kremlin and has provided material and spiritual support to Russia during the war. This explanation makes little sense, however, as the ROC clearly faces no threats from the Ukrainian government in Russian-occupied territory. The Ukrainian government is not engaging in religious suppression, moreover, but rather acting against religious elements it asserts are linked to the Kremlin’s war effort. Russian authorities have conducted systematic religious persecution in occupied Ukraine since the start of the war, however.

Sources: ISW (July 16 Update)

ISW (July 15 Update)

CNN

The Washington Post

The New York Times