Weekly Update #90
November 20

Covers those granted refugee status, temporary asylum status, temporary protection, or statuses through similar national protection schemes, as well as those recorded in the country under other forms of stay

Refugees from Ukraine recorded beyond Europe

392,100

Last updated October 14 2023

Refugees from Ukraine recorded globally

6,287,500

Last updated November 14 2023

Source: UNHCR collation of statistics made available by the authorities

STATUS OF THE CONFLICT

Continuing conflict

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 18 Shahed-131/136 drones of which Ukrainian forces destroyed 16. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson stated that the Russian military has concentrated over 800 missiles, including Kalibr and Onyx missiles, in occupied Crimea and intends to use all of them against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in winter 2023

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, near Robotyne, and northeast of Vasylivka and advanced near Avdiivka.

Ukrainian military reports ‘successful operations’ on Dnipro River’s east bank. Ukrainian troops have conducted a series of successful operations on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River, the country’s military said on Friday.

The claim comes after official acknowledgment from Russia and Ukraine earlier this week that Ukraine had established positions on the eastern side of the river, which marks the frontline for a stretch of territory in south-east Ukraine. Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces have established bridgeheads on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are conducting ground operations aimed at pushing Russian forces out of artillery range of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.

Pushing the Russians further back from the riverbank would also bring some respite to the communities on the other side that have come under constant attack in recent months. Russian forces have been bombarding towns and villages on the western bank with artillery from their positions, including the city of Kherson, which is attacked on a near daily basis.

The continued Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has resulted in equipment and maintenance failures that threaten the plant’s security. Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom reported on November 16 that Russian ZNPP authorities transferred reactor no. 5 to a hot shutdown state from a cold shutdown state in violation of Ukraine’s nuclear regulatory orders, resulting in a leak of a boric acid solution that entered all the reactor’s steam generators.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not yet commented on incidents in the ZNPP, but expressed concern on November 13 over the extent and effectiveness of maintenance on ZNPP safety systems and its own ability to monitor ZNPP operations.

The Ukrainian and IAEA reports indicate that Russia’s presence and exclusive control over the ZNPP is increasing, suggesting that similar failures may escalate under continued Russian occupation. The IAEA announced on November 13 that its staff visited a Russian training center for the ZNPP on November 7 and that Russian nuclear regulatory agency Rostekhnadzor is establishing a permanent presence at the ZNPP.

The Kremlin has launched a wide-ranging campaign to force Ukrainians in occupied territories to become Russian. Ukrainians are being denied healthcare and free movement unless they take up Russian citizenship, evidence suggests. The European Broadcasting Union (EBU), an alliance of public service media including the BBC, interviewed refugees for the investigation. They spoke of relentless pro-Russian propaganda in the occupied lands.

Other types of pressures include withholding of pensions, food, and medical services without Russian passports. Numerous checkpoints have been set up to check documents and refuse exit from occupied territories without passports.

Thousands of Ukrainian children are being taken to Belarus, according to Yale researchers. More than 2,400 children from Ukraine aged between six and 17 have been taken to 13 facilities across Belarus since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, according to new research. The estimates are the most up-to-date after Ukraine's prosecutor general said in May that he was investigating the alleged role of Belarus in the forced transfer of children from Russian-occupied territories.

In research released yesterday by Yale University, more than 2,000 children were reported to have been transported to the Dubrava children's centre in Belarus' Minsk region between September 2022 and May 2023.

Another 392 children were taken to 12 other facilities.

Sources: ISW (November 16)

The Guardian

BBC

ISW (November 17)

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Protection of civilians in armed conflict

October 2023 update

OHCHR has documented civilian casualties in Ukraine since 2014. The numbers are based on information that the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) has collected through interviews with victims and their relatives; witnesses; analysis of corroborating material confidentially shared with HRMMU; official records; open-source documents, photo and video materials; forensic records and reports; criminal investigation materials; court documents; reports by international and national non-governmental organisations; public reports by law enforcement and military actors; data from medical facilities and local authorities. All sources and information are assessed for their relevance and credibility and cross-checked against other information. In some instances, corroboration may take time. As a result, civilian casualty figures may be revised as more information becomes available.

Statistics presented in the current update are based on individual civilian casualty records where the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard of proof was met, namely where, based on a body of verified information, an ordinarily prudent observer would have reasonable grounds to believe that the casualty took place as described.

SUMMARY

The number of civilian casualties remained high in October with 605 civilians killed or injured.
Most civilian casualties (92 per cent) continued to occur in Government-controlled territory. The majority of civilian casualties continued to occur in areas near the frontlines by shelling and multiple-launch rocket systems.
Numbers in October showed an 11 per cent decrease in the number of civilian casualties compared with numbers in September, continuing to show a gradual decline in 2023.
On 5 October, Russian armed forces launched a missile against a funeral reception in Hroza, Kharkiv oblast, killing 59 civilians. The attack was the deadliest in 2023 in terms of civilian casualties and constituted 33 per cent of civilians killed in October.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OCTOBER 2023

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES SINCE 24 FEBRUARY 2022

Source: OHCHR

THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Source: OCHA

UN ASG briefs the Security Council on Ukraine

This particular briefing delivered by the UN ASG for Human Rights Brands Kehris specifically refers to the freedom of religion or belief.

Tensions between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which has historic links to the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which obtained autocephaly under the Constantinople Patriarchate in 2019, including over ownership of land and buildings, increased following the Russian Federation’s full-scale armed attack in February 2022, in some cases manifesting in violent incidents.

Mr. President,

These tensions have affected freedom of religion in the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine, as documented in consecutive recent Human Rights Monitoring Mission reports.

Firstly, since February 2022, OHCHR has documented ten cases of physical violence and six cases of threatened violence resulting from disputes between parishioners of different Orthodox communities. Regrettably, Ukrainian law enforcement’s response in these cases has been inadequate, failing to sufficiently investigate incidents and take action to protect members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Half of these incidents occurred in March and April of this year, and the number of incidents subsequently decreased. In this regard, the recommendations in the Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on Ukraine from February 2022 are still relevant, including the protection of places of worship against acts of violence, intimidation and vandalism and ensuring that all cases of violence are thoroughly and promptly investigated and that those responsible are sanctioned.

Secondly, since February 2022, of the over 6,600 criminal cases brought against individuals for collaboration and other conflict-related crimes in Ukraine, 68 have involved Ukrainian Orthodox Church clergy members, according to Ukrainian authorities. OHCHR is monitoring 44 of these cases. It is particularly important to ensure full respect for due process and fair trial rights in these extremely sensitive cases. In at least 26 cases involving UOC clergy members, we have identified concerns regarding the fairness of the criminal proceedings, such as the accused not having access to a lawyer during a search of his home or pressure from prosecutors to confess in order to obtain lighter charges or be included in a prisoner exchange. Our findings have come in the context of our broader reporting on due process and fair trial issues that have arisen in proceedings against conflict-related detainees as a whole.

Thirdly, OHCHR is closely monitoring how legislative developments in Ukraine may impact enjoyment of freedom of religion and has in previous HRMMU reports expressed concern over the cumulative impact of Government actions targeting UOC that could be discriminatory.

In October 2023, Ukraine’s Parliament approved in its first reading a set of draft amendments to the law on religious organizations. This would establish a procedure for the dissolution of “religious organizations affiliated with influence centers, the management of which is located in a country, which carries out armed aggression against Ukraine.” This draft law is now being considered in a committee in preparation for a second reading. We urge lawmakers to carefully consider Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the related Human Rights Committee jurisprudence. International law permits restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion only if they are prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. This is to be narrowly interpreted, and limitations must be directly related and proportionate to the specific purpose pursued.

As a next step, we would urge lawmakers to clearly define the specific legitimate aim of the proposed restrictions and ensure their necessity and proportionality and revise the text accordingly. I invite Ukrainian lawmakers to make use of the expert analysis of the United Nations and other international organizations – as it has done for other laws – to assess whether the proposed means are clearly defined and the least intrusive ones possible for achieving the specific aim, and whether the proposed amendments comply with international legal standards.

Mr. President,

OHCHR also has serious concerns about freedom of religion in Ukrainian territory occupied by the Russian Federation which could also be considered discriminatory. The prosecution of minorities and detentions and torture of clergy raise serious concerns about discrimination on the grounds of religious belief in occupied territory. International humanitarian law obliges the occupying Power to respect the laws in force in the country. However, the Russian Federation applies its own laws in occupied territory, which has resulted in restrictions on religious minorities.

Previous HRMMU reports have also documented cases of enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture or other ill-treatment, and unlawful deportations perpetrated by Russian armed forces against clergy and members of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Chirstian Evangelical communities in Zaporizhie, Kherson and Kharkiv region.

In Crimea, Russian authorities have prosecuted members of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Hizb ut-Tahrir, two organizations that are prohibited in the Russian Federation, but not in Ukraine, sometimes sentencing them to long prison terms. Since February 2022, we have documented the prosecution of nine members of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Most recently, on 24 August 2023, following house searches, the FSB arrested six Crimean Tatar men for their alleged membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir. After 24 February 2022, Russian authorities arrested eighteen Crimean Tatar men in Crimea, for suspected involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir. They potentially face long-term sentences in prison.

We have also seen that occupying authorities have taken action against the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. In Simferopol, the occupying authorities evicted the Orthodox Church of Ukraine from the cathedral, depriving parishioners of their last place of worship in the city.

Our Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has reported individual cases of arbitrary detention and torture of clergymen in occupied territory Last month, the documented arbitrary detention of two priests from the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in the occupied Donetsk oblast was reported; they were accused of anti-Russian and extremist behavior for publicly expressing support for the Ukrainian authorities.

The last Human Rights Monitoring Mission periodic report issued in October included the arbitrary detention of two Orthodox clergymen in occupied territory, one of whom reported having been tortured. In May of this year, a pro-Ukrainian priest from Kherson oblast was released after spending 262 days in detention, where he was reportedly tortured; formal charges were never brought against him, but he reported having been questioned repeatedly about why he conducted church services in Ukrainian and prayed for Ukrainian forces. These cases of alleged torture of clergy fit into a pattern of widespread torture of civilian detainees, as publicly reported by HRMMU.

Concerns regarding the enjoyment of freedom of religion in Ukraine, including in occupied territory, have increased since February 2022. Restoring peace and respect for the United Nations Charter and international law is urgent. While the war and occupation persist, we call on all parties to ensure that all people in Ukraine have full freedom to manifest and practice their religion or belief, in line with international human rights law.

Thank you.

Source: OHCHR

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Preparing for Cold Months: Winterisation response from local perspectives (November 2023)

This report is prepared by REACH, a leading humanitarian organization providing in-depth data and information in crisis and displacement contexts. Its activities are aimed to provide accessible and timely information on humanitarian situation of conflict-affected populations. This report focuses on learnings from the experience of the 2022 winterization response, based on interviews with key informants. This article presents highlights of the report.

To help guide humanitarian actors’ winterisation response in Ukraine, OCHA's Winter Response Plan emphasizes the importance of supporting front line communities and areas hosting a high number of IDPs, especially those in collective centres.

Of the 18 million people in need across Ukraine, 1.7 million are targeted for winter activities, including 1.6 million for shelter and NFI assistance, 0.8 million for WASH assistance, and 0.15 million for food security and livelihoods-related assistance.

A winterisation response funding gap of 300 million USD means that an evidence-based, targeted allocation of resources is essential to ensure priority needs are addressed this winter.

COLD SPOTS FOR THE 2023/24 WINTER

This map illustrates the pattern of Cold Spots across Ukraine: areas where cold weather (hazard) coincides with exposure, susceptibility and lack of coping capacity. The Cold Spot Index (CSI) supports the identification of areas where populations are likely to be most impacted by winter-related hazards in the context of the ongoing conflict.

The identified raions with the highest Cold Spot Index align with areas prioritised for the provision of solid fuel, and with the distribution of households in need of winterisation assistance during the 2023/24 winter according to the Ministry of Reintegration. Namely, six out of seven raions with the highest CSI (all except Vinnytskyi raion) are within the oblasts with the highest number of households with winter-related needs according to the Ministry’s data.

BEST PRACTICES

Key Informants s also discussed successful coping strategies and measures taken during last winter season. The most frequently mentioned ones were the use of generators and charging stations. However, despite the popularity of generators as a backup power source, KIs reported some drawbacks, including high prices for powerful generators, high fuel requirements, and the need to turn generators off occasionally. At the same time, the share of key infrastructure equipped with more sustainable backup power sources, such as photo-voltaic stations and heat pumps, has been gradually increasing thanks to international support.

Among implemented effective winterisation response practices from the previous year include:

Electricity

Use of power banks and flashlights;
Alternative power supply sources;
Energy saving measures (e.g., installation of efficient heating systems; and wall, roof, and window insulation).

Heating

Use of solid fuels;
Diversifying fuel sources at the household level to avoid dependency on only one fuel source;
Individual stove for heating (e.g., makeshift stoves);
Backup power supply for centralised heating systems;

Water supply and sewage

Using autonomous water supply systems;
Installing treatment plants;
Repair of damage to and restoration of water supply system relying on decentralised power sources, such as generators.

CHALLENGES

In terms of expected challenges for the winter 2023/24, KIs mostly mentioned planned and emergency power outages and possible shelling, a lack of fuel for heating devices, damaged power system, potential damage or disruptions of heat supply, along with safety factors and weather conditions. Also reported was shortage of qualified workers in the heat LUC, decreased number of residents (subscribers to LUC), and lack of heating appliances. Donetska and Kharkivska oblasts have some of the highest projected petrol prices for the coming winter season (59 Ukrainian hryvnias per litre), which is a concern given the relatively high reliance on petrol (50% and 44% of customers reported using petrol, respectively) and the increased costs associated with running generators during outages. By way of comparison, Vinnytska oblast is reportedly the most dependent on gas for heating (98% of customers), making it vulnerable in case of damage to centralised gas supply infrastructure.

UNMET NEEDS

Additional resources most needed to cope with winterisation challenges include:

various types of equipment, including soldering systems for heat supply, boiler and conveyor equipment, reinforced rods, perforating machines and tools, backup equipment, sewage cleaning equipment, and accessories for electricity equipment,and construction materials such as reinforced concrete blocks, and tarpaulin.
Financial resources, fuel such as petrol, diesel and solid fuel (e.g. pellets, coal, wood), and transformer oil; and pipes.
Other commonly reported needs were specialists and personnel, generators and charging stations, makeshift stoves, alternative power sources, and transport for repair works and evacuation.

The scale and range of unmet needs may increase in the event of air strikes on energy infrastructure this autumn and winter.

CONCLUSION

The challenges that Ukraine faces ahead of the coming winter are underscored by widespread humanitarian needs resulting from a protracted conflict, mass displacement of people, extensive damage to residential and public service infrastructure, and continuing military activities.

While seasonal forecasts predict warmer-than-normal weather conditions for winter 2023/24, late winter could see colder conditions than average. Cumulative damage to critical infrastructure has reduced the resilience of power systems, increasing the likelihood of frequent blackouts and brownouts. This situation could worsen if further strikes on energy infrastructure occur. Active fighting near the front line may also lead to additional damage and population displacement.

Lessons from the previous winter point to:

the importance of flexible, rapid responses to emergency outages, closer collaboration with humanitarian aid providers, the deployment of heating points, and transitioning to decentralised heat and power sources where suitable.
the need for close coordination among winterisation actors, engagement with local representatives, and ongoing needs assessments to ensure that support aligns with the specific requirements of different regions.
In a longer-term perspective, the development of less centralised power systems to help the functioning of key infrastructure more independently.

The success of these efforts will much depend on several interrelated factors, which are beyond the control of any winterisation actors, including the potential for further damage to energy production and heating infrastructure, residential buildings, and public utilities, as well as ongoing military activities, population displacement, and evolving humanitarian needs.

Source: REACH

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EU is providing additional €110 million in humanitarian aid to support Ukrainians affected by the war

As Russia's war against Ukraine continues, the humanitarian situation in the country remains dire. The onset of winter poses further challenges to the already vulnerable communities impacted by the war.

The Commission is therefore allocating €110 million in humanitarian aid of which €100 million will go to operations in Ukraine and €10 million to support Ukrainian refugees and host communities in Moldova.

This new funding will help the EU's humanitarian partners to provide essential services like cash assistance, food, water, shelter, health care, psychosocial support, and protection.

The latest allocation brings the total for EU humanitarian aid in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine to €843 million.

In light of last year's deliberate attacks by Russia on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, the EU is also prioritising emergency energy support to Ukraine by deploying a further 84 power generators from its rescEU strategic reserves.

Overall, more than 5,000 power generators have been sent to Ukraine via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. In addition, the EU is coordinating donations from the private sector to deliver crucial energy equipment to Ukraine.

Source: ECHO

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CEB approves €100 million to Ukraine to restore healthcare and meet urgent needs for health services

The Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) today approved a €100 million loan to the Ministry of Health of Ukraine to finance the restoration of health infrastructure damaged by the war and meet urgent health needs.

According to the Ministry of Health data, the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has caused approximately $2.5 billion in damage to the health sector infrastructure. As a result, the availability and accessibility of health services in Ukraine have been severely curtailed, particularly in the regions where armed conflict has taken place.

The CEB’s loan will support the Health Enhancement and Life-Saving (HEAL) project, a $500 million framework operation developed by the World Bank in collaboration with the Ukrainian authorities, which is designed to bring together development partners. The World Bank has already approved $100 million loan and $20 million in grants to get the project off the ground.

The funding from the CEB will enable the Ministry of Health to strengthen primary health care, supporting mobile teams that provide essential health services in areas of the country affected by the war as well as remote ones. The project will also finance renovation of hospital buildings and help address urgent new health needs, in particular related to mental health.

In the long-term, the project will increase the resilience of Ukraine’s health sector through targeted investments in e-health and introducing new functions for sustainable and innovative health service delivery.

This is the first CEB loan operation in Ukraine since the country’s accession on 15 June 2023.

Source: CEB

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War in the Breadbasket: Landmines and food security in Ukraine

The Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) prepared an analysis of the impacts of landmines and ERW on food security in Ukraine and across the region. The analysis makes a strong proposition on the importance of humanitarian demining in maintaining food security. Excerpts from the report are featured in this article.

Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal in July 2023 and any further reduction of Ukrainian grain exports are likely to have serious implications for both Ukraine’s agricultural sector and economy and for food security far beyond Europe’s borders, driving up food prices and hindering humanitarian agencies’ ability to respond to food crises.

However, the war has not only impacted Ukraine’s ability to export food but also its food production. Extensive contamination with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) could keep large areas of agricultural land out of use, potentially for many years, jeopardizing both domestic and international food security. As the Ukrainian government readies a new mine action strategy, it should consider how to address important concerns about the regulation and prioritization of humanitarian mine action.

Landmines and food systems

Violent conflict can disrupt every step of the food supply chain, from production and storage to transportation and consumption. Landmines and ERW have a well-documented and significant role in this. They threaten the physical safety of farmers, agricultural workers and livestock, leading to casualties and lost income.

Landmines and ERW could also affect markets, food processing and storage facilities, and the roads between them.

Moreover, contamination can directly compromise the delivery of humanitarian assistance and, over time, reverse hard-earned development gains through population displacement, lost livelihoods and lost revenue.

The scale of contamination has grown enormously, most visibly in areas once occupied by Russian forces, such as in the Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. Due to long-range artillery fire from Russian forces as well as Ukrainian defensive measures, landmine and ERW contamination is also found in areas further away from the frontlines. Furthermore, contamination presents serious obstacles in some areas that are no longer directly affected by the fighting and are starting the process of recovery.

Humanitarian demining and food security

Humanitarian demining—the careful clearance of landmines and ERW to enable the safe return of an area to civilian uses—is essential to restoring agricultural production, bolstering food security and economic recovery. The positive impact of land clearance on food security, sometimes in approaches that integrate demining with other agricultural interventions, has been demonstrated by past initiatives in Cambodia, Colombia and Syria.

The Ukrainian humanitarian mine action sector is notably complex and rapidly evolving. As of November 2023, activities are supervised by three centres under the interministerial National Mine Action Authority. These centres are run by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the State Transport Special Service.

Several internationally supported humanitarian demining initiatives focus on restarting agricultural production on land affected by the Russian invasion. For example, a collaboration between the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the WFP and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) targets smallholder farms. Meanwhile, livelihood support in Ukraine from the International Committee of the Red Cross has included explosive ordnance risk education and risk-mitigation measures aimed at protecting mine-affected communities. Nevertheless, demining efforts explicitly aimed at restoring food production have started quite recently and are still on a small scale.

Balancing risks and priorities

Another important issue for the coordination of humanitarian demining is which areas to prioritize. When it comes to agricultural land, Ukrainian authorities must carefully manage the potential trade-offs between the immediate humanitarian imperative of protecting life and limb and the longer-term imperatives of restoring food production (and thus alleviating food insecurity) and economic recovery.

Looking ahead

The number of local actors who seem willing to join the humanitarian demining effort suggests that government authorities should focus on coordination and streamlining accreditation processes. This would improve the availability of competent, officially recognized mine action services and reduce the risks to farmers from ineffective work by untrained and unofficial demining surveys.

Beyond that, there is a need for the Ukrainian authorities to keep on top of the profusion of new local, national and international actors engaged in humanitarian demining in liberated agricultural areas, so that that their efforts are directed in line with demining priorities.

Source: SIPRI

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WFP expands its support to the national school feeding programme in Ukraine

The UN World Food Programme (WFP) today signed agreements with oblasts to support daily school meals for more than 60,000 children in 420 schools across the country.

In the last academic year, WFP and the Ministry of Education and Science signed a Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on the implementation of the school feeding programme. During this first phase of the programme, WFP supported the preparation of meals for 12,000 children in 58 schools in the Kyiv oblast. Thanks to generous funding from the Government of France and private donors, WFP was able to expand the programme across the country this year.

During the 2023-2024 academic year, WFP will fund 30% of the daily hot meals for children in schools in the Kyiv, Lviv, Zakarpattia, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Cherkasy, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Poltava oblasts. Schools will utilize the funds received through the programme to improve the quality of the meals or to reduce the fee paid by parents to the canteen.

Oblasts were selected based on a range of criteria, including food security level, as well as the number of internally displaced persons.

WFP operates within the framework of the Government’s School Nutrition Reform, in close coordination with the Ministry of Education and Science, oblast and hromada authorities and schools.

France, whose funding enabled the expansion of the school feeding programme, recently hosted the first global summit of the School Meals Coalition, which strives to ensure every child receives school meals by 2030.

School feeding is one of many ways WFP supports Ukrainians affected by the war. WFP also distributes food parcels in areas closest to the frontline, where food is hard to find or very expensive, as well as cash assistance to displaced and vulnerable Ukrainians across the country. WFP is also supporting the safe release of mined agricultural land in the Kharkiv region to help farmers and food producers resume work.

Source: WFP

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"Conditions this winter will be even more challenging for the people": Malteser International

The second winter since the start of the major invasion is approaching for the people in Ukraine. After nearly two years of war, almost 18 million Ukrainians are reliant on humanitarian assistance. People's living conditions have further deteriorated since the past winter. Many power plants and energy distribution centers have been damaged or destroyed. "We anticipate that this winter will be even more difficult than the last. The energy infrastructure was heavily damaged by over 1,500 attacks last winter, and we expect that there will be prolonged power and heating outages again this winter – especially if there are renewed attacks," reports Melanie Plöger, who coordinates the assistance for Malteser International in Ukraine.

To provide for the people in the south and east of Ukraine during the cold winter months, the Malteser will distribute 2,000 food packages and 1,400 winter packages containing sleeping bags, blankets, insulation mats, lamps, and other items crucial in the cold season over the next few weeks in Ukraine. "Damage to the infrastructure and continuous bombings of front-line areas – as well as more distant cities – complicate the provision of essential supplies to the affected population. But we strive to maintain support for people even in remote areas," says Plöger.

After the occupation of Eastern Ukraine by Russia in 2014, Malteser International, together with Ukrainian Malteser and two other local partners, initiated psychosocial support for displaced people in the east of the country in 2015. After the major invasion in 2022, the assistance was expanded.

Source: Malteser International

HOLY FATHER ON UKRAINE

Angelus - November 19, 2023 (Sunday)

And, brothers and sisters, let us continue to pray for tormented Ukraine – I can see the flags here – and for the populations of Palestine and Israel. Peace is possible. It takes good will. Peace is possible. Let us not resign ourselves to war! And let us not forget that war is always, always, always a defeat. The only ones to gain are arms manufacturers.

E, fratelli e sorelle, continuiamo a pregare per la martoriata Ucraina – vedo le bandiere qui – e per le popolazioni di Palestina e Israele. La pace è possibile. Ci vuole buona volontà. La pace è possibile. Non rassegniamoci alla guerra! E non dimentichiamo che la guerra sempre, sempre, sempre è una sconfitta. Soltanto guadagnano i fabbricanti di armi.

Links to the full text in ITALIAN and ENGLISH

General Audience - November 15, 2023

Preghiamo tutti insieme per i bisognosi e per i rifugiati dalla martoriata Ucraina.

Preghiamo, fratelli e sorelle, per la pace, in modo speciale per la martoriata Ucraina che soffre tanto, e poi in Terra Santa, in Palestina e Israele, e non dimentichiamo il Sudan che soffre tanto, e pensiamo dovunque c’è guerra, ci sono tante guerre! Preghiamo per la pace: ogni giorno, qualcuno si prenda qualche tempo per pregare per la pace. Vogliamo la pace. A tutti la mia Benedizione!

Links to the full text in ITALIAN