Weekly Update #97
January 8, 2024

REFUGEE SITUATION

(as of 3 January 2024)

General Figures


Refugees from Ukraine recorded across Europe 

5,936,700

Last updated January 3 2024

Covers those granted refugee status, temporary asylum status, temporary protection, or statuses through similar national protection schemes, as well as those recorded in the country under other forms of stay 


Refugees from Ukraine recorded beyond Europe

403,600

Last updated November 28 2023

Covers those granted refugee status, temporary asylum status, temporary protection, or statuses through similar national protection schemes, as well as those recorded in the country under other forms of stay 


Refugees from Ukraine recorded globally

6,340,300

Last updated January 3 2024

 

Source: UNHCR collation of statistics made available by the authorities

THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

OCHA released a detailed document – Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans 2024 Ukraine – that presents “a shared understanding of the crisis, including the most pressing humanitarian need and the estimated number of people who need assistance. It represents a consolidated evidence base and helps inform joint strategic response planning.”

As the document is an extensive presentation of the response vision for 2024, we are presenting in this issue only some of the document highlights.  We highly recommend exploring the full document, which can be found in: https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023-enuk 

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Context highlights


1.   The numbers of people in need are staggering:


2.   The humanitarian crisis in Ukraine remains a protection crisis. 


3.   The war has continued to have a devastating impact on Ukraine’s economy forcing people to face increased levels of poverty and dependence on aid.


4.   The war has severely impacted people’s access to health care, education and other basic services.


5.   Ukraine’s infrastructure has suffered considerable damage, including transport, energy, communications and water, affecting a significant proportion of the population.


6.   An estimated 1.4 million homes in Ukraine have been damaged or destroyed since the escalation of the war.



7.   The war continues to take a heavy toll on the country’s economy.


8.   The war has seen damage across many regions, with incidents at nuclear power plants and facilities, energy infrastructure, industrial sites and agro-processing facilities. The result has been multiple air pollution incidents and potentially serious contamination of ground and surface waters.



Distribution of people in need by raion


Strategic Objectives of the Response

Strategic Objective 1:

Provide principled and timely multisectoral lifesaving assistance to internally displaced people, non-displaced war affected people and returnees, ensuring their safety and dignity. 



Strategic Objective 2:

Enable access to basic services for internally displaced people, non-displaced war-affected people and returnees.


Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance as a Strategic Intervention

In 2024, humanitarian actors will continue to prioritize the use of cash and voucher assistance (CVA) in Ukraine, including multi-purpose cash assistance (MPCA), in line with Grand Bargain commitments and subsequent momentum around CVA as an institutional and system- wide priority. By the end of September 2023, over 3 million people in Ukraine had received MPCA from 90 humanitarian organizations, out of an overall objective of 4.4 million people reached by the end of the year.


Operational Considerations

Cost

The humanitarian community will require $3.11 billion to provide multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance to 8.5 million people in Ukraine in 2024, out of 14.6 million in need.


Operational Partners

The humanitarian community in Ukraine has had a well established operational presence across the country, with 530 operational organizations as of October 2023, as reported by clusters.

In 2024, a similar number of partners are foreseen to remain operational. A large number of national partners (342 in total), many of which operate as first responders’ front-line actors, will provide humanitarian assistance and protection to the most vulnerable. In addition, there are 143 international NGO partners, 16 government partners, 13 United Nations (UN) agencies, 6 partners from other international organizations, 2 from the private sector and 21 from other categories listed as clusters’ partners.


Selected Cluster Objectives

There are nine cluster areas and 3 sub-areas. Seven cluster areas and two sub-areas are featured below.

Ensure safe and dignified living conditions for internally displaced people in displacement sites, while informing and supporting the collective sites’ population to pursue their self-reliance and create linkages with durable solutions.


Provide access to quality in-person, online and blended (mixed methods of in-person and online) learning formats in safe and inclusive learning environments for war-affected children.


Address immediate life-saving priorities and strengthen the self-reliance of vulnerable, war-affected households and communities through two complementary cluster objectives applying a combination of in-kind and marketbased responses (cash and voucher) through 124 national and international NGOs and 3 UN agencies, and livelihood activities through 44 implementing partners.


Provide principled and timely, multisectoral, life-saving assistance to internally displaced people, people who remain at their homes and returnees, ensuring their wellbeing, safety, and dignity.


Ensure vulnerable internally displaced people, non-displaced people, and returnees are provided with principled and gender- and age-responsive protection; and enable equitable access to basic services and legal and human rights for internally displaced people, non-displaced and returnees through the implementation of protection interventions aimed at strengthening the national protection systems and the capacity of service providers and communities themselves.


Vulnerable internally displaced people, non-displaced people and returnees, particularly vulnerable women and girls, but also men and boys have improved access to safe, confidential, timely and quality coordinated GBV services through inter-sectoral referrals at local levels; Vulnerable internally displaced people, non-displaced people and returnees are supported with gender-based violence interventions.


Provide lifesaving, specialized child protection services applying a multi-faceted, socio-ecological approach, to address the priority needs of identified vulnerable girls and boys, including survivors of grave violations against children, and their families in priority geographical areas, including areas of acute displacement, areas where the Government of Ukraine has re-established control and other areas with limited access to social services.


Provide life-saving shelter and NFI support to war-affected internally displaced people, returnees and non-displaced people; Deliver emergency shelter and NFI assistance mitigating the impacts of harsh winter weather for internally displaced people, returnees and non-displaced people, while minimizing environmental impact; Ensure adequate housing solutions for internally displaced people, returnees and non-displaced people, while fostering linkages to longer-term response.


Ensure the most vulnerable people affected or displaced by the war can access basic WASH services and materials to maintain basic hygienic practices;  Support service providers ability to ensure regular operations and maintenance, and emergency repairs, necessary to maintain service-level related to water, sanitation and wastewater, solid waste and district heating systems especially  locations within 100km of the front line and/or receiving large numbers of displaced people; Support improvements in WASH facilities (in quantity, accessibility, safety, and privacy) and access to personal and environmental hygiene materials and supplies for basic infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, especially  key social institutions, notably health care facilities (HCFs), collective sites, retirement homes and orphanages and schools.


MAJOR CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION

Nearly 120,000 internally displaced people across Ukraine's 2,600 collective sites will not have access to safe and dignified living conditions.

About 1 million people will not have access to life-saving emergency food assistance along the front line, while 1.8 million vulnerable, war-affected people will not be able to protect nor restore their food production and livelihoods, further affecting their food insecurity.

Some 2.9 million internally displaced people, returnees and non-displaced war-affected people, including those found to be in the most vulnerable conditions, would see their rights violated.

Some 3.8 million people will not have access to uninterrupted affordable life-saving and primary health services.

Some 3.9 million people will be exposed to harsh weather conditions unless they receive life-saving shelter and critical household items, including adequate housing solutions, as well as winter support.

Without a timely, principled and coordinated response, people remaining in areas close to the front line will not be able to be assisted on time, which could be a matter of life and death for some.

Source: OCHA 

STATUS OF THE CONFLICT

(as of 4 January 2023)

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 4 that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran. Kirby stated that North Korea provided Russia with ballistic missile launchers and an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and that Russian forces launched at least one of the North Korean missiles into Ukraine on December 30, 2023. Kirby also stated that Russian officials continue efforts to buy ballistic missiles from Iran.

 

Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because these missiles appear to be more effective at striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances. Russian forces routinely use short-range ballistic missiles to strike Ukrainian cities closer to the frontline, and these missiles appear to be more effective at penetrating or avoiding Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted 149 of a reported 166 Russian cruise missiles in intensified attacks since December 29, 2023, but have only intercepted a handful of the ballistic missiles that Russia has launched at Ukraine in the same period.

 

Russian forces have repurposed S-300 and S-400 air defense missiles for conducting strikes against surface targets in Ukraine, and Ukrainian officials have acknowledged that Ukrainian air defenses struggle to intercept these unorthodox missile attacks using their own S-300 and S-400 systems.   Ukrainian forces have also appeared to be less successful in intercepting Iskander ballistic missiles during recent strikes, although Ukrainian forces did intercept an Iskander-M missile during a less intense series of Russian missile and drone strikes on December 30.

 

The relative success that Russian forces have had in striking targets in Ukraine with ballistic missiles in combination with cruise missiles and drones may be prompting an intensification of Russian efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad. Russia can reportedly produce roughly 42 Iskander missiles and four Kinzhal missiles per month, although it is unclear how many S-300/S-400 missiles Russia can produce.  Russia‘s defense industrial base (DIB) likely cannot produce ballistic missiles at the scale required for a persistent strike campaign in Ukraine that relies on regularly expending a large volume of ballistic missiles, and Russia likely has to source ballistic missiles from abroad if it wishes to maintain large-scale missile strikes against Ukraine.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree strengthening procedures for granting foreign citizens Russian citizenship in exchange for Russian military service in Ukraine, likely as part of ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into the Russian military. The January 4 decree grants Russian citizenship to foreign citizens who have signed at least a year-long contract with the Russian military or “military formations,” likely referencing volunteer formations and private military companies (PMCs), during periods of “special military operations.” The decree also grants Russian citizenship to the spouses, children, and parents of the foreigners serving with the Russian military.

 

The decree reduces the time it takes for these foreigners to receive and be considered for Russian citizenship from three months to one month. Russian authorities have routinely offered Russian citizenship to migrants in exchange for Russian military service in Ukraine and have threatened to revoke Russian citizenship from naturalized migrants if they refuse to serve in the Russian military.

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Russia has begun negotiations with Algeria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia to open Russian cultural centers (Russkii dom) abroad, likely aimed at increasing Russian influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russian media previously reported that Russia is also in negotiations to open additional Russkii dom centers in Brazil, South Africa, Angola, and Mali by 2025.  Russia currently has over 80 Russkii dom centers concentrated in Europe, Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia aimed at promoting Russian culture, strengthening the influence of the Russian language, supporting “compatriots abroad,” and preserving historical sites abroad with significance to Russia.


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The largest exchange of prisoners of war since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war took place on Wednesday, prompting hopes that POW swaps will continue after they stalled last summer. Confirming the exchange, Russia said it received 248 prisoners of war from Ukraine, while Ukraine said it got 230 of its military personnel and captured civilians back. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the prisoner exchange came about with mediation from the United Arab Emirates.  

 

The exchange comes after prisoner exchanges stalled at the end of last summer, leading to regular protests by the families of POWs who demanded the exchanges resume. Many families have not heard from their loved ones since they were captured by Russia early on in the war.


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 The latest missile attacks on Ukraine indicate that Russia is targeting Ukraine’s defense industry rather than energy infrastructure, as seen last year. “Since 29 December 2023, Russia has increased the intensity of its long-range strike operations against Ukraine,” the U.K.’s Ministry of Defence said Wednesday.

It noted that Russian forces had committed a “significant proportion” of the stock of air-launched cruise missiles and ballistic missiles that they had built up in recent months to strikes on targets across Ukraine in the last week.

“The recent strikes likely primarily targeted Ukraine’s defense industry. This contrasts with its major attacks last winter which prioritised striking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

Russian air defenses downed dozens of Ukrainian drones in occupied Crimea and southern Russia on Friday, officials said, as Kyiv pressed its strategy of targeting the Moscow-annexed peninsula and taking the 22-month war well beyond Ukraine’s borders.

Air raid sirens wailed in Sevastopol, the largest city in Crimea, and traffic was suspended for a second straight day on a bridge connecting the peninsula, which Moscow seized illegally a decade ago, with Russia’s southern Krasnodar region. The span is a crucial supply link for Russia’s war effort.

Following a drone strike deep inside Russia last year, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had developed a weapon that can hit targets 700 kilometers (400 miles) away. He said last month Kyiv plans to produce 1 million drones, which have become a key battlefield weapon.


Other Ukrainian officials said it aims to manufacture this year more than 10,000 attack drones with a range of hundreds of kilometers, as well as more than 1,000 longer-range drones that can hit targets well behind the front line and inside Russia.

Both sides are raising the stakes of their long-range warfare as soldiers remain bogged down on the wintry battlefield. The U.K. Defense Ministry said Friday that “ground combat has continued to be characterized by either a static front line or very gradual, local Russian advances in key sectors.”

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Ukrainian forces are conducting a multi-day strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and have successfully struck several targets throughout the peninsula. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an administrative building at the Russian airfield in occupied Saky, Crimea.

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The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 6 that it is delaying its first delivery of six F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine for up to six months. Denmark’s transfer of 19 American-made F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine will take place in the second quarter of 2024, once Ukrainian pilots have completed training, the defence ministry has said.  This was, however, refuted by the Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson.


Sources: ISW (January 4)

CNBC

AP News


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Ukraine’s hopes for victory fade in the face of waning Western support and Putin’s relentless war machine


A year ago, a resolute President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled direct from the battlefield of Bakhmut to address the US Congress and meet with President Joe Biden. He was feted as a hero; Ukraine’s determination to resist Russian aggression met with strong bipartisan backing in Washington.

One year on, the outlook looks much grimmer. A long-anticipated Ukrainian offensive in the south has made scant progress. Russia appears to have weathered international sanctions, for now, and has converted its economy into a war machine.

The Russian way of war, absorbing hideous losses of men and materiel but throwing yet more into the fight, has blunted the Ukrainian military’s tactical and technological edge, as its top general admitted in a candid essay last month.

The mood in Moscow seems grimly determined: the goals of the “special military operation” will be achieved, and the fighting will continue until they are.

 

As the long frontline becomes ever more calcified, the Kremlin senses greater skepticism among Kyiv’s Western backers that Ukraine can recover the 17% of its territory still occupied by Russian forces.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is relishing the much more partisan atmosphere in Washington, where many in the Republican Party are questioning the purpose of sending Ukraine another $61 billion worth of aid as requested by the Biden administration, assessing that it will achieve little on the battlefield.

At the same time, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban blocked a $55 billion EU package of financial aid for Ukraine, prompting one German politician to say that it was like having Putin himself sitting at the table.

That jeopardizes government spending on everything from salaries to hospitals.

Zelensky, who by his own recent admission is tired, has an ever-harder job as Ukraine’s chief salesman, with events in the Middle East diverting attention from Ukraine as the number-one international crisis.

On the first anniversary of the invasion, he predicted that “2023 will be the year of our victory!” He’s unlikely to make the same optimistic forecast for the coming year.

Russia is not without its own vulnerabilities, but they are more long-term. The conflict has exacerbated its demographic crisis through emigration and battlefield losses. Nearly 750,000 people left Russia in 2022; analysts expect an even higher number will have voted with their feet this year.

The deeply partisan mood in Congress has scuppered the Biden’s administration’s request for further aid for Kyiv. Currently allocated funds for military equipment are nearly drained. One Democratic senator, Chris Murphy, said starkly: “We are about to abandon Ukraine.”

The mantra in Western capitals on supporting Ukraine has been “as long as it takes.” But standing next to Zelensky this month, Biden said the US would support Ukraine “as long as we can.”

While the global metrics for Ukraine deteriorate, so the frontlines offer little cheer.

The much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive launched in June was meant to display the superiority of NATO’s strategy of combined arms warfare, drilled into newly-minted Ukrainian brigades who were trained in muddy fields in Germany. But it was alien to Ukrainian military culture and was not matched by superiority in the skies.

What should have been a dash south to the Black Sea became a quagmire in dense minefields, with Western armor picked off from the air by Russian drones and aviation.

Ukrainian units took at most 200 square kilometers of territory over six months. The goals of reaching the coastline, Crimea and splitting Russian forces in the south remained a distant dream.

The pool of military recruits in Ukraine has substantially shrunk; battlefield losses have deprived the military of tens of thousands of experienced soldiers and mid-rank officers. “Sooner or later we are going to find that we simply don’t have enough people to fight,” Zaluzhny told the Economist in November.

The arrival of F-16s fighter jets in the spring will undoubtedly help the Ukrainian air force challenge Russian combat planes and support their own ground forces, but they will be no silver bullet. Basic training is one thing; flying into the teeth of Russian air defenses another.

Ukraine’s goal of recovering all its territory is “out of reach,” they say bluntly. “Where we are looks at best like a costly deadlock.”

They recommend that Ukraine shifts to a defensive posture in 2024 to stem losses, which would “shore up Western support by demonstrating that Kyiv has a workable strategy aimed at attainable goals.”

The Russian military, which has by and large proved inept in offensive operations, would thereby find it even more difficult to take ground.

To others, such a shift would essentially reward aggression, enabling Russia to pause and regroup, with potentially dangerous consequences for others in Russia’s near-abroad. It would also send the wrong message about US commitment to other allies, such as Taiwan. And it’s a non-starter, politically, in Kyiv.

There are certainly signs of tensions within Ukrainian society as the conflict nears its second anniversary and the economy struggles to start growing again, after shrinking by one-third. The longer several million Ukrainians live elsewhere in Europe, the less likely they are to come back.


Sources: CNN

CNN

HOLY FATHER ON UKRAINE

Angelus - January 7, 2024 (FEAST OF THE BAPTISM OF THE LORD)

I am very close to the peoples of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, afflicted by floods in recent days. And please, let us continue to pray for peace: for peace in Ukraine, in Palestine, in Israel and all over the world.

Sono molto vicino alle popolazioni della Repubblica Democratica del Congo colpite nei giorni scorsi da inondazioni. E per favore continuiamo a pregare per la pace; per la pace in Ucraina, in Palestina, Israele e nel mondo intero.

Links to the full text in ENGLISH and ITALIAN

Angelus - January 6, 2024 (SOLEMNITY OF THE EPIPHANY OF THE LORD)

And thinking of that historic gesture of fraternity in Jerusalem, let us pray for peace, for peace in the Middle East, in Palestine, in Israel, in Ukraine, all over the world. So many victims of war, so many deaths, so much destruction… Let us pray for peace. 

E pensando a quello storico gesto di fraternità compiuto a Gerusalemme, preghiamo per la pace in Medio Oriente, in Palestina, in Israele, in Ucraina, in tutto il mondo. Tante vittime delle guerre, tanti morti, tanta distruzione… Preghiamo per la pace.

Links to the full text in ENGLISH and ITALIAN

General Audience - January 3, 2024

E non dimentichiamo i popoli che sono in guerra. La guerra è una pazzia, sempre la guerra è una sconfitta! Preghiamo. Preghiamo per la gente in Palestina, in Israele, in Ucraina e in tanti altri posti dove c’è la guerra. E non dimentichiamo i nostri fratelli Rohingya, che sono perseguitati.

Links to the full text in  ITALIAN

MEMBER PHOTOS

Modular houses are constructed according to high EU standards and are located in Mukachevo, Svalyava and Serednie (a village near Uzhhorod). In total, Caritas Czech Republic will provide modular houses for 120 people. In addition, we are also reconstructing old buildings in Transcarpathia that are not finished or are in poor condition. (Courtesy of Caritas Czech Republic)

We have trained total of 60 local psychologists and social workers in the provision of psychological care in crisis situations. (courtesy of Caritas Czech Republic)