Weekly Update #154
February 10, 2025

Source: UNHCR collation of statistics made available by the authorities

In the 11 months of 2024, 8 million people across Ukraine received at least one form of humanitarian assistance from some 645 organizations.

By November, nearly 364,000 people received winter-related assistance under the 2024-2025 Winter Response Plan, including support for winter energy, non-food winter supplies and uninterrupted health care during the cold season. 

By the end of November, the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan was 62 per cent funded, as the onset of winter added a new dimension to the response to the humanitarian crisis in the country.

Source: Humanitarian Bulletin

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Paper 2 by PAX Protection of Civilians

This is the second of the PAX Briefing series.  It focuses on the issue of Evacuations. The first briefing paper was featured in Update #153. PAX brings together people who have the courage to stand for peace. PAX works to build just and peaceful societies across the globe.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, evacuations have taken place across the country and throughout different phases of the war. Most large-scale evacuations occurred in the first weeks and months following the invasion and predominantly in Ukraine’s border areas with Russia and Belarus, or in the direct vicinity of areas of active combat, such as large parts of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kherson, and Mykolaiv Oblasts. By May 2022, IOM had recorded a peak of 8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Ukraine, as well as 5.7 million people who had fled to other countries.  Ukrainian Railways alone reported evacuating 4 million people to safer areas by train during the first year of the full-scale war. As of late 2024, recent Russian advances on cities like Pokrovsk are leading to a resurgence in evacuation needs.

After the full-scale war’s first months and especially following Ukraine’s liberation of the Kyiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts, the planning and coordination of evacuations of frontline communities became more organized. Evacuations were also increasingly about removing just one or two at-risk frontline communities to safer areas, contributing positively to their timeliness and safety. The decreased scale further allowed for more targeted support for vulnerable civilians and for more attention to the needs and wishes of the population.

Challenges faced by Ukraine

Varying levels of preparedness for evacuations

In Ukraine, the effectiveness and success of evacuations has varied across communities and administrative regions, particularly in the first months of the full-scale war. An important contributing factor was that, prior to February 2022, the development of evacuation plans was not centrally enforced. Combined with surprise over the speed of the RAF’s advance, some communities were slow to evacuate or did so chaotically. Often, this came at the expense of more vulnerable groups in society. In other cases, notably in Bucha and Mariupol, civilians trusted their local authorities who assured them that they would be protected and that there was no need to evacuate. Especially during the beginning of the full-scale war, there were not always clear mechanisms in place for information sharing and coordination between these different actors, impeding overall efficiency.

RAF targeting and obstructionism

An immense complicating factor in the organization of safe evacuations in Ukraine has been apparently deliberate targeting by the RAF of evacuees and evacuation gathering points, and a lack of willingness to agree to green corridors.

Remaining populations

In every armed conflict, there will be civilians who choose to remain amid dangerous circumstances rather than evacuating to safer, but often unfamiliar places. Ukraine has been no exception, and the majority of our interviewees stressed this as a main protection challenge. Those directly involved in organizing evacuations shared that disinformation about the Ukrainian conscription process as well as the supposedly bad treatment of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in other parts of the country contributed to an unwillingness to evacuate among certain segments of the population. This leaves people at increased risk of harm and the AFU with less freedom of movement. Importantly, it should be noted that decisions to stay do not forfeit the protected status civilians enjoy during armed conflict, nor does it automatically indicate that those who remain behind are supportive of the adversary.

Post-evacuation support and needs

While Ukraine has set up various support schemes for IDPs, for instance related to employment, several Ukrainian civil society representatives argued that these programs fall short of meeting people’s actual needs. Accommodation arranged for IDPs is also not always designed for long-term stay, lacking privacy, or is unsuitable for people with specific needs. Reportedly, this has led to situations where some IDPs returned to their original communities, telling others that they could not find suitable jobs or accommodation in the areas of relocation.

Good practices established by Ukraine

Increased evacuation guidance and coordination

Despite initial challenges, Ukraine quickly adapted to the demands of the new situation following Russia’s full-scale invasion, among others by establishing the ‘Coordination Headquarters for the Mandatory Evacuation of the Population under Martial Law’. This body advises the government and coordinates with various relevant stakeholders.

Adaptations to decrease targeting risks

Local authorities involved in the organization of evacuations have launched various adaptive measures to increase civilians’ security and protection. Such measures include the organization of more frequent but smaller evacuations to spread the risk and reduce the visibility of such operations; announcing evacuations with less time in advance or through less public channels; and the installation of mobile shelters in locations where people gather ahead of evacuations.

Novel ways to convince people to leave at-risk areas

Various stakeholders involved in evacuations have shown themselves to be similarly adaptive in seeking to convince people to leave dangerous areas. This includes providing people with accessible information on what they can expect once they have evacuated; picking people up from their home addresses if they have trouble reaching official gathering points; using videos with messages from relatives who urge those who have stayed behind to evacuate; and sometimes by also facilitating that smaller pets can be taken along.

Source: PAX

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3 million people in Ukraine will be targeted for health assistance this year

WHO launched its 2025 Ukraine Emergency Appeal seeking $68.4m to meet critical health needs.

Insecurity, damage to and lack of maintenance of aging health facilities and medical equipment, shortages of medicines and medical supplies, understaffing, and curtailed access to referral hospitals and pharmacies have all taken a toll on the provision and accessibility of health care services. The war's impact on public health is of grave concern, particularly as public funding is redirected towards military expenses.

Health system recovery remains one of WHO's key priorities in Ukraine, which goes beyond rebuilding damaged or destroyed medical facilities. WHO aims to support the country in restoring essential services, and the financing of these essential services, such as rehabilitation, primary health care (PHC), public health surveillance, all of which are critical for overall national recovery.

People in need in 2025

• 12.7 million people in need (5.2 million in 10 priority regions

• 9.2 million people in need of health assistance

• 3 million people targeted by the Health Cluster partners, i.e. in 10 priority regions and war-affected communities

The WHO  focus remains on sustaining and scaling up essential health services in Ukraine,” according to Dr Hans Henri P. Kluge, WHO Regional Director for Europe. “ WHO’s emergency response strategy in Ukraine for 2025 is designed to strengthen emergency and critical health care services, ensure continuity of essential health service delivery, and address the profound impacts of war on the health care network – particularly in contact line regions.

WHO’s 2025 response strategy is anchored on five key pillars:

1. Strengthen emergency medical services (EMS) and trauma care systems to ensure emergency response in priority regions.

2. Ensure continuity and quality of essential primary health care (PHC) services and outreach initiatives for war-affected populations.

3. Enhance coordination among health partners and improve health information management for accurate data collection, reporting, needs assessment and disease surveillance.

4. Address critical concerns hampering health security and resilience in emergency settings, such as weather preparedness and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) prevention, among other priorities.

5. Support key health recovery priorities in emergency settings, to ensure quality care and sustainable access.

Through these targeted interventions, WHO aims to mitigate the devastating health consequences of the ongoing conflict and strengthen the resilience of Ukraine’s health system. With an emphasis on collaboration, innovation, and inclusivity, WHO remains committed to protecting health and saving lives in one.

Source: WHO

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UNDP partners with the governments of Ukraine and Spain to restore war-damaged schools

Eight Ukrainian schools will be rebuilt to enhance energy efficiency and accessibility standards.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine, with financial support from the Government of Spain, has launched the “Re-Envisioning Educational Facilities in Ukraine: Rehabilitation and Repairs of War-Damaged Social Infrastructure” project. This initiative emphasizes energy-efficient reconstruction and the incorporation of alternative power systems, adhering to the Build Back Better principle.

Scheduled for completion by the end of December 2026, the project aims to deliver significant energy efficiency improvements, including high-quality thermal insulated facades, terrace envelope systems to minimize heat loss during winter and heat absorbed in summer, solar hot water collectors, photovoltaic systems, efficient LED lighting, and movement sensors in the corridors. The renovations also prioritize inclusivity and gender-responsive standards, ensuring a secure and conducive learning environment.

One school will undergo major repairs and serve as a “pilot school,” modernized in line with the “New School Concept” developed in partnership with the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and contributing to Ukraine’s EU accession efforts.

Oksen Lisovyi, Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine, underscored the project’s significance, and specifically the pilot school as a way of envisioning the whole educational system. “The key goal of the project is to ensure equal access to education in Ukraine despite the ongoing war. As part of a joint initiative with UNDP and Spain, eight schools in Volyn, Kyiv, Lviv, and Sumy oblasts will be restored by December 2026. This will enable over 5,000 students and 450 staff members to continue teaching and learning in safe and suitable premises.”

The full-scale invasion has taken a devastating toll on Ukraine’s educational sector, with approximately 4,000 educational facilities being reported as damaged or destroyed since February 2022 according to the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. This destruction has severely disrupted the learning process, affecting millions of children and prompting the urgent need for comprehensive restoration efforts. Rebuilding these schools is critical for not only restoring access to education, but also fostering resilience in war-affected communities.

D. Ricardo López-Aranda Jagu, Ambassador of Spain to Ukraine, emphasized the importance of the project in the context of the Fast Recovery Plan of Ukraine.  His remarks committed to  “retrofitting and restoring schools according to the Build Back Better approach”, so capacities of local communities can be strengthened.

Jaco Cilliers, UNDP Resident Representative in Ukraine thanked the Spain-UNDP cooperation that enabled this initiative.

Background

The Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) stated that 13 percent of Ukraine’s educational infrastructure was war-damaged. Partnering with the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), UNDP aims to renovate eight war-affected educational facilities with a total budget of EUR 4 million. Restoration efforts will focus on light and medium repair work at schools with damage rates equal to or below 60 percent, including the installation of energy-efficient equipment and compliance with principles of accessibility.

Source: UNDP

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"Between Us" - Piloting Assessment Report

Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, millions of Ukrainians have been displaced, have been exposed to violence and other potentially traumatic events, and face daily adversities that increase the risk of mental health and psychosocial problems.

Results from an assessment of mental health and psychosocial problems and needs conducted by HIAS revealed that 18 months into the war, 35% of respondents reported poor well-being and quality of life with 26% of respondents reporting symptoms indicating depressive symptoms. Epidemiological data collected during the war also indicate a high burden and prevalence of common mental disorders among Ukrainians.

Women in Ukraine were disproportionately affected by mental health and psychosocial problems. Common mental health and psychosocial problems included chronic anxiety, moral exhaustion, and fatigue. Despite this elevated burden, research has also documented the high levels of resilience, sociocultural resources, and coping strategies buffering these risk factors.

Prior to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, there existed a large treatment gap in services for people with mental health and psychosocial problems. The war in Ukraine has exacerbated this lack of access and by significantly disrupting health service delivery and reducing access to mental health and psychosocial support services available through the national health and social services system. Furthermore, the unique stressors and context of the war necessitate services that are tailored to the needs of individuals displaced and otherwise affected by the war as well as the resources that are available.

One recommended strategy to overcome these barriers and limitations of existing services is to prioritize community-based services that leverage existing social resources, strengthen social connectedness and peer support, and are not reliant on services and facilities that may be non-functional, overwhelmed, and/or not accessible to communities in conflict settings. These recommendations are consistent with those that have emerged from existing mental health and psychosocial needs assessments in Ukraine. While community-based interventions are limited in Ukraine, available evidence and models of community-based MHPSS support the feasibility of these interventions and their ability to bridge gaps in access and utilization of MHPSS.

Informed by these needs and recommendations and building on HIAS’ global experience with adaptations for community-based mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) interventions, we decided to utilize an intervention designed with displaced and migrant communities in Latin America to support the mental health and psychosocial needs of women.

The intervention, Between Us (originally ‘Entre Nosotras’), was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under the Health Evaluation and Applied Research Development (HEARD). This research was intended to fill a gap that exists in MHPSS research in LMICs, and especially in humanitarian contexts, that highlights a need for flexible processes to facilitate rigorous design and evaluation of adaptable community-focused intervention. Between Us is a five-session, 2 hours each, community and strengths-based MHPSS intervention that aims to mobilize social support, strengthen community connectedness, and promote collective action to increase safety and well-being of women. This report describes the adaptation, piloting, and evaluation of the Between Us intervention in Ukraine.

Perceived impacts of Between Us among clients, providers and other stakeholders

The Between Us intervention pilot demonstrated positive impacts on the participants' psychosocial well-being, sense of community, and understanding of gender-based violence. All participants reported feeling more connected to other women, with 92% indicating that the intervention improved their ability to support one another. Additionally, 73% of participants showed an increased understanding of gender and GBV, as well as awareness of available services, while 61% felt able to develop a safety plan.

However, participants’ perception of the safety plan activity appeared to be influenced by ongoing conflict and other, not GBV related risks. These findings align with previous evaluations of Entre Nosotras/Between Us, which

similarly found the intervention to be appropriate, acceptable, and feasible.

In previous studies, non-specialized facilitators similarly appreciated learning new skills and being able to support other women in their communities.

Participants also identified social connectedness and learning strategies that helped them to cope with stress as central impacts of the intervention. An important difference between previous evaluations and the current study, is that Between Us has not been previously implemented in an active conflict setting.

Findings

Therefore, some of the unique findings relative to the safety plan in this evaluation may largely be explained by the context. This evaluation identified several areas that warrant further improvement and adaptation to the Between Us intervention:

• Clarifying the Focus of Safety Planning. While the safety plan was initially intended for GBVscenarios, participants frequently associated it with immediate threats like shelling. Forvexample, 61% of participants indicated that they were confident in their ability to make a safetyvplan. This indicator may have been interpreted as broader perception of “safety”: while the safety plan activity was designed to address GBV specifically, many participants interpreted it through the lens of immediate threats like shelling, reflecting the heightened security concerns in their environment. Future intervention cycles could more clearly distinguish between safety plans for GBV and broader safety concerns

• Inclusion of Additional Resources. Participants requested more educational or informational resources on mental health and GBV, indicating a need to deepen the intervention informational components.

• Expanding Activities. Suggestions to add more relaxing activities after sensitive or potentially emotionally engaging exercises can be explored to enhance the program’s appeal.  Alternatively, Between Us could be complemented with other non-specialized community-based activities

• Broadening the target population: The Between Us intervention appears to work effectively across a wide age range, as evidenced by the positive feedback from both younger and older participants. Both participants and facilitators suggested that the program could be extended to a broader range of women, with a particular focus on teens, as well as family members of servicepeople and veterans. This expansion would address the unique needs of these groups, helping them build social support networks and cope with stress, similar to the benefits observed in the current participant pool.

Source: HIAS

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Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) - December 2024

In December, local markets continued to function reliably, effectively supplying basic needs nationwide despite increased challenges faced by retailers, including a worsening security situation, power cuts, rising business costs, and accelerating prices. However, in the East and South, namely in Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, and Zaporizka oblasts, customer KIs were more likely to report restricted access to markets due to security concerns.

In some frontline hromadas, customers also faced shortages of essential items and fuels, as well as limited access to cash due to the absence or insufficient functioning of bank branches and ATMs. Inflation for consumer goods and services accelerated annually, reaching 12% in December, driven largely by continued increases in food prices.

The median cost of the full JMMI basket rose by 15% over the year, with the highest value in December recorded in the North, specifically in Chernihivska oblast. The food component of the JMMI basket experienced the sharpest price increases, rising by 23%. Notably, the most significant annual surges in prices were observed for vegetables, including cabbage (+201%), carrots (+143%), and potatoes (+85%).

Nationwide, rising prices have severely impacted access to goods, with 70% of customer KIs citing higher prices as their primary financial barrier. The elderly population was particularly affected, with 90% of customer KIs aged 60 and above reporting that they could not afford essential items available in stores. This issue was most prevalent in the North and East.

Rising prices remained the main barrier to accessing goods available in stores for customers surveyed by JMMI, escalating from 59% at the start of the year to 70% by its end. This issue also topped the list of challenges faced by retailer KIs.

Annual inflation, after reaching its lowest levels in the spring, surged considerably toward the end of the year, reaching 12%. The most significant price increases were observed in electricity and basic food items, including vegetables, butter, sunflower oil, milk, and bread.

The escalation situation in the East, including the shift in the frontline, had a noticeable impact on the functioning of markets in this region:

• The proportion of customer KIs reporting restricted access to markets rose sharply from 44% in January to 64% in December, driven by a 2–3 times increase in customers citing security-related factors such as active fighting and shelling, feeling unsafe, and restriction on movement; availability issues with essential items persisted throughout the year; affordability concerns intensified, with the proportion of customer KIs reporting financial barriers rising from 78% in January to 93% in December;

• Retailers also faced heightened challenges, as the proportion reporting war-related difficulties increased from 38% to 65%. 

These findings highlight the heightened vulnerability of the population in the East, where meeting basic needs seems to have become increasingly challenging.

Sources: IMPACT Initiatives, REACH 

This update on the status of the conflict relates the method in which the Ukrainian army attacked the Kursk Oblast.

A small group of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast have complicated the Russian military's efforts to advance in Ukraine over the last six months. Roughly a division's worth of Ukrainian troops have undermined the Russian military's ability to launch or renew offensive operations in lower-priority areas of the frontline and to reinforce priority efforts with elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units. The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast is a partial proof of concept of how limited Ukrainian battlefield activity that leverages vulnerabilities in Russia's warfighting capabilities and that integrates technological adaptations with mechanized maneuver can have theater-wide impacts on operations. It showed that surprise is still possible even on a partially transparent battlefield and that rapid maneuver is possible under the right conditions. The war in Ukraine, in other words, is not permanently stalemated. Either side can potentially restore maneuver and begin to gain or regain significant territory. Russia will be able to do so if the West reduces or cuts off aid. Ukraine may be able to do so if Western support continues to empower Ukrainian innovation.

The Russian military command has gathered around 78,000 troops, including 11,000 North Koreans, in an attempt to expel Ukrainian forces from positions in Kursk Oblast over the last six months. An estimated 11,000 Ukrainian forces advanced into Kursk Oblast in early August 2024, seizing the tactical initiative and complicating the Russian military's Fall 2024 offensive effort.[1] Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly delayed his deadlines for Russian forces to push Ukrainian troops from Kursk Oblast first by mid-October 2024 then by January 2025 and repeatedly prioritized Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast over regaining control of the Kursk salient, which Russian forces still had not done at the end of January 2025.[2] Putin has not been able fully to insulate Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast from the theater-wide impacts of the incursion, however, and the Russian military has simultaneously been pulling troops, armored vehicles, and artillery and air defense systems away from other sectors in Ukraine to reinforce the Russian force grouping fighting in Kursk Oblast. Recent Ukrainian estimates indicate that Putin has accumulated roughly 67,000 Russian troops and 11,000 North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast expel a reinforced Ukrainian grouping in Kursk Oblast that now constitutes at most 30,000 troops by the most generous Western estimations.

Ukraine conducted the incursion at a critical moment to gain leverage in the battlespace and successfully inflicted asymmetric, theater-wide impacts on the Russian military with this limited ground operation. The first seven months of 2024 were characterized by the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, continued Russian offensive operations west of Avdiivka in Spring and Summer 2024, the Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, and intensified Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk and Kurakhove directions in June and July 2024.[4] Critical delays in Western aid over the winter of 2023-2024 created shortages in Ukraine's air defense interceptors and Ukrainian artillery units and wider vulnerabilities in Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian attacks.[5] Western leaders and intelligence agencies spent most of early 2024 advocating for Ukraine to maintain an "active defense" and focus on repelling and slowing Russian advances before attempting another counteroffensive operation possibly in 2025.

The Russian military command has essentially treated the Russia-Ukraine international border as a dormant front of the theater since 2022 and thus failed to sufficiently fortify and man the border, leaving it vulnerable to Ukrainian attack. The Kremlin has failed to prioritize security along the international border with northern Ukraine throughout the invasion in favor of fortifying and reinforcing Russian positions in eastern and southern Ukraine.[9] The Kremlin has largely relied on Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia units, territorial defense units, and poorly trained conscripts to defend the border over the last three years.[10] Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a future Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024 but failed to take adequate steps to address this threat.

Ukrainian forces largely relied on small and maneuverable mechanized mobile groups during the initial days of the incursion in August 2024 to advance up to 35 kilometers into Kursk Oblast by exploiting the vulnerabilities along Russia's border. Ukrainian mobile groups advanced through a series of limited Russian fortifications along the international border near Nikolayevo-Darino (north of Sumy City along the international border) and Oleshnya (just northeast of Sumy City along the border) on August 6 and quickly seized the Sudzha border checkpoint south of Sudzha and captured a group of conscripts defending the checkpoint.

Russian forces were unprepared for both the time and manner in which Ukrainian forces attacked and for the innovative techniques that Ukrainian forces leveraged to integrate ground activity, air defense assets, and unmanned systems during the initial days of the incursion.[27] The current Ukrainian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is almost certainly larger than the initial incursion force but likely still significantly smaller than the estimated 78,000 Russian and North Korean troops currently operating in Kursk Oblast.

Source: ISW

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As Trump pushes for ceasefire talks, Ukraine sees Kursk as a potential bargaining chip

Ukraine has launched new attacks in Russia’s southern Kursk region as US President Donald Trump pushes for ceasefire talks.

The Institute for the Study of War, a US-based conflict monitor, said that Ukrainian forces launched a new series of assaults in the Kursk region on Thursday, advancing up to five kilometres (three miles) behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha.

While it is not clear whether the attacks are aimed at seizing more territory or reinforcing Ukraine’s defensive positions, Institute on the Study of War analyst Angelica Evans said advances of such scale were impressive.

Kyiv surprised even its allies with its attack on Russian territory and keeps fighting in Kursk even as it faces extremely difficult situations elsewhere along the frontline.

Russia claimed on Friday that it has now taken over Toretsk, an industrial town in eastern Ukraine that has been one of the epicenters of the fight for the past six months. Ukraine has not commented on the claim, but if confirmed, the fall of Toretsk would be another strategic win for Moscow as it would bring Russian troops closer to important Ukrainian defensive posit.

At the same time, Russian troops have been inching towards Pokrovsk, a logistic hub in eastern Ukraine that has been in Russia’s sight since the summer, and Kupiansk in the north.

Some in Ukraine, including some troops fighting in Kursk and elsewhere, are questioning Kyiv spending precious resources in Russia when it is struggling to defend its own territory.

The answer likely comes down to the expectation that Trump might start pressuring Ukraine to agree to talks with Russia soon.

Ukraine’s military and political leaders have repeatedly said that the Kursk operation was aimed at preventing a new Russian offensive in northern Ukraine and forcing Moscow to redeploy some of its troops from elsewhere in Ukraine.

The country’s President Volodymyr Zelensky said Friday North Korean troops returned to battle in the Kursk region following earlier reports of the units being pulled back from the fighting after suffering mass casualties. He said hundreds of North Korean and Russian troops were “eliminated” while battling Ukrainian forces.

The incursion was Ukraine’s biggest strategic gain since the liberation of Kherson in November 2022 and it gave the country a major morale boost.

Rare strategic gain for Ukraine

But this week, as Trump continued his calls for negotiations to end the war, Zelensky made it clear Kyiv sees Kursk as a potential bargaining chip.

Speaking on Wednesday, he called the incursion “a very important operation.”

It’s been six months since Kyiv launched its surprise incursion into the Kursk region and while Russia has managed to reclaim more than half of the territory initially ceased by Kyiv, this came at a huge cost to Moscow.

The Ukrainian General Staff said Thursday that Russia lost 40,000 troops over the six months of fighting in Kursk – 16,100 of whom were killed.

The incursion marked the first time foreign troops took control of Russia’s territory since World War II – a huge embarrassment for the Russian President Vladimir Putin who has largely framed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as means to “defend” the country.

The Ukrainian military has estimated that Russia deployed some 78,000 troops into Kursk, several times as many as Ukraine has. “These Russian forces, which include elements of elite units, are tied up and really distracted in Kursk. [Otherwise] they would more than likely be fighting on the frontlines in eastern Ukraine where they could do a lot of damage,” Evans said.

Yet despite the numerical advantage, the Russian military struggled to push the Ukrainians out of its territory and so Moscow eventually called in foreign reinforcements, deploying some 12,000 North Korean soldiers into the Kursk region.

Source: CNN

Zelenskiy says 'Let's do a deal', offering Trump mineral partnership, seeking security

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy pored over a once-classified map of vast deposits of rare earths and other critical minerals during an interview with Reuters on Friday, part of a push to appeal to Donald Trump's penchant for a deal.

The U.S. president, whose administration is pressing for a rapid end to Ukraine's war with Russia, said on Monday he wanted Ukraine to supply the U.S. with rare earths and other minerals in return for financially supporting its war effort.

Ukraine floated the idea of opening its critical minerals to investment by allies last autumn, as it presented a "victory plan" that sought to put it in the strongest position for talks and force Moscow to the table.

Zelenskiy said less than 20% of Ukraine's mineral resources, including about half its rare earth deposits, were under Russian occupation. Rare earths are important in the manufacture of high-performance magnets, electric motors and consumer electronics; Zelenskiy said Moscow could open those resources to its allies North Korea and Iran, both sworn U.S. enemies.

"We need to stop Putin and protect what we have - a very rich Dnipro region, central Ukraine," he said.

Russian troops have been gaining ground in the east for months, throwing huge resources into an unrelenting offensive while Kyiv's much smaller army grapples with a shortage of soldiers and frets over future weapons supplies from abroad.

Zelenskiy unfurled a map on a table in the heavily-defended president's office in Kyiv, showing numerous mineral deposits, including a broad strip of land in the east marked as containing rare earths. Around half of it looked to be on Russia's side of the current frontlines.

He said Ukraine had Europe's largest reserves of titanium, essential for the aviation and space industry, and uranium, used for nuclear energy and weapons. Many of the titanium deposits were marked in northwestern Ukraine, far from the fighting.

Ukraine has rapidly retuned its foreign policy approach to align with the transactional world view set out by the new occupant of the White House, Ukraine's most important ally.

But Zelenskiy emphasised that Kyiv was not proposing "giving away" its resources, but offering a mutually beneficial partnership to develop them jointly

He said Russia knew in detail where Ukraine's critical resources were from Soviet-era geological surveys that had been taken back to Moscow when Kyiv gained independence in 1991. In addition, Zelenskiy said Kyiv and the White House were discussing the idea of using Ukraine's vast underground gas storage sites to store U.S. liquefied natural gas.

Source: Reuters

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Ukraine gets French Mirage fighter jets, more F-16s from the Netherlands

Ukraine’s air force got a boost in its fight against Russia on Thursday with the arrival of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets from France, along with F-16s from the Netherlands.

French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu confirmed the transfer of the Mirage jets in a post on X, adding the fighters were flown by Ukrainian pilots who have been training for months in France. French President Emmanuel Macron had promised the Mirage jets to Ukraine last summer.

“The Ukrainian sky is becoming more secure!” Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said in a post on Facebook.

Welcoming the arrival of “the first French Mirage 2000 fighter jets and F-16s from the Kingdom of the Netherlands,” Umerov said: “These modern combat aircraft have already arrived in Ukraine and will soon begin carrying out combat missions, strengthening our defense and enhancing our ability to effectively counter Russian aggression.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked Macron on Thursday for “his leadership and support.”

The new fighters are expected to boost Ukrainian forces’ ability to provide air cover for troops, attack ground targets, take on enemy planes, and intercept missiles.

The latter role could be vital. Russia has stepped up missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, often sending dozens in one night, taxing Ukraine’s air defense batteries.

Mirages could also be used to launch longer-range missiles such as the SCALP, also known as the Storm Shadow, at targets well inside Russia, said Layton, a former Royal Australian Air Force officer.

Ukraine received its first F-16s last summer, with Zelensky at the time thanking the Netherlands, Denmark and the United States – where the F-16s are built – for the aircraft, without saying how many were delivered.

Source: CNN